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Executive summary
This document analyses selected issues, effects and implications of the Cotonou 
Agreement (Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000) on Caribbean economies with a focus on Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) countries.
The Cotonou Agreement replaces the Lomé agreement which provided the framework for 
trade and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and African Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) States since 1975. It overhauls the trade relations between both.
The main objective of the new partnership agreement is the ‘eradication of poverty in a 
consistent manner with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of 
the ACP countries in the world economy’. The agreement comprises four distinguishing features. 
First, it incorporates the political dimension in the negotiations. Second, it envisages a 
participatory approach incorporating the different sectors of society in the consultative and 
decision-making process. Third, it places a strengthened focus on poverty reduction through 
social and economic development and the deepening of regional integration. Fourth, it overhauls 
the principle of non-reciprocity which formed the basis for trade relations in the Lomé 
conventions.
With the Cotonou Agreement, ACP countries have agreed to turn their non-reciprocal 
trading arrangement with Europe into fully reciprocal regional integration areas in the form of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). ACP countries launched negotiations for EPA in 
September 2002.
The Caribbean region and the EU started the EPA negotiations in April 2004. The EU 
and CARIFORUM (CARICOM plus the Dominican Republic) are the negotiating partners. 
CARICOM’s Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) negotiates on behalf of CARIFORUM. 
The EPAs timetable includes four phases and both trading partners are about to embark on the 
third phase of the negotiation.
The progressive dismantling of trade barriers and preferences will further integrate ACP 
countries into the multilateral system and make the EU-ACP trade relation World Trade 
Organization (WTO) compatible. In this sense the Cotonou Agreement argues that the move 
towards a free-trade area will bring benefits, such as the benefit of cheaper EU imports, but it 
also recognizes that the ACP States may also have to face major challenges. At the same time, 
the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement may have significant economic and social 
impacts.
The EU applies very low or zero tariffs on most of its imports from ACP countries so that 
the effect of the removal of trade barriers on the external sector or for fiscal performance is 
bound to be modest. In other words the costs of trade liberalization for the EU are minor.
Contrarily ACP States will have to face the full force of global competition. As a result 
they must use the preparatory period to modernize their economies and become more
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competitive. The transformation of their economies will require major adjustment costs in some 
cases. To address the challenges and constraints the ACP countries have to face, it is crucial to 
combine trade and economic policies with social development policies. From the point of view 
of the agreement, this should lead to economic growth and eventually poverty reduction.
The timetables for trade liberalization and the scope of trade liberalization have not yet 
been negotiated. As a result the measurement of the effects of EPAs can only be a tentative and 
very preliminary exercise. ACP countries have, however, expressed concerns about the effects of 
trade liberalization. The validity of these concerns has been recognized by the EU and by some 
of the impact studies that have been undertaken.
These include the loss of export earnings due to the erosion of trade preferences, the 
potential increase in imports due to the decline in tariffs, the vulnerability of some sectors to 
increased competition including not only the agricultural but also the manufacturing sector. In 
addition the potential costs of job losses and the social dislocation have also been pointed out as 
potential negative effects of EPAs.
At the same time EPAs are expected to induce greater flows of foreign savings. If 
properly channeled, a greater level of foreign savings may result in expanding productive 
capacity leading to a higher level of economic growth. A greater level of foreign savings would 
soften the external constraint and growth would allow the expansion of government revenue.
From the point of view of this document EPAs will have three important effects on 
CARICOM economies.
First, they will provide an incentive for CARICOM to accelerate and perfection its 
regional integration process. Regional integration is seen as a pre-condition for extraregional 
integration. The region can be a training ground for firms to become competitive at the 
extraregional level.
Second, the EPAs will accentuate the economic tendencies that are entrenched in 
CARICOM. These include the stagnation of agriculture, the virtual disappearance of the 
manufacturing sector in some of the smaller States and the continued dynamism of the services 
sector. EPAs should ensure that their provisions do not lead to a process of economic duality, 
marginalisation of the traditional sectors of the economy, and annihilation of the manufacturing 
sector.
Third, the EPAs will also provide an opportunity for CARICOM countries to restructure 
or to continue to restructure their economies to adapt to a changing environment. Firms in the 
Caribbean have begun a process of restructuring production aimed at reducing costs. Firms 
expect to achieve a reduction in costs via; (i) the expansion of their installed capacity; (ii) a 
change in the methods of production; and (iii) diversification in their product lines.
The document is structured in seven sections. The first section describes the origins of the 
Cotonou agreement. The second section addresses the main traits and mentions its five pillars. 
The third section focuses on the protocols and more specifically on the sugar and banana
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protocols. The fourth section centers on the negotiations between CARIFORUM and the 
European Union. The fifth section focuses on Europe’s Outermost Regions in the Caribbean and 
the Overseas Territories and Countries in the region that constitutionally depend on a member 
State of the European Union. The sixth section analyses the trade flows in goods and services 
between the Caribbean and the European Union focusing on the exports of CARICOM to the 
European Union as well as on the market for Caribbean imports. The last section ascertains the 
potential impact of the EPAs using static and dynamic analysis.
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From 1975 until 2000 the Lomé Convention provided the framework for trade relations 
and cooperation between the European Union and former colonies of its member States that 
gained independence after World War II. These newly independent countries benefited from 
duty-free access to the European market for a number of export products from African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP) on a non-reciprocal basis. In 2000, the Lomé Convention 
was replaced by the Cotonou agreement, named after the city in Benin where the agreement was 
reached.
The Cotonou agreement aims to “promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social 
development of the ACP States, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to 
promoting a stable and democratic political environment” . It envisages four broad areas of 
support and spells out new orientations regarding economic and trade cooperation.
A key objective is to integrate the beneficiary countries into the global economy. Non­
reciprocal trading arrangements will gradually be replaced by fully reciprocal integration areas in 
the form of regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) which also provide for 
supporting initiatives in a several broad areas. The EPAs would form the basis for the 
establishment of a free trade area with the European Union (EU). ACP countries launched the 
EPA negotiations in September 2002 and CARIFORUM began the regional negotiations for the 
Caribbean in 2004. The EPAs timetable includes four phases. Presently CARIFORUM is about 
to embark on the third phase of the EPA negotiations, with the objective of arriving at elements 
of a draft agreement by December 2006.
In the opinion of the negotiating parties, the move towards a free trade area with the 
European Union will bring benefits to ACP countries. The negotiating parties, especially ACP 
countries, understand the need to change the practices that have guided trade relations in the past 
three decades. At the same time they recognize that ACP countries will face important economic 
and social challenges especially those derived from the reform of the Protocols.
Although the agreement aims to improve the insertion of ACP countries in the global 
economy and several areas of cooperation are directly oriented to stimulate exports through 
investment promotion and business development, the new trade regime contained in the EPA is 
bound to also have negative effects on export revenue as Caribbean exports face the erosion of 
trade preferences. Another likely effect is the increase in imports following a decrease in tariffs. 
The implications for the balance of payments are uncertain. The agreements may also have 
negative consequences for fiscal revenues, through tariff reductions and the narrowing of the tax 
base. Moreover, erosion of trade preferences and enhanced competition on domestic markets 
may affect employment.
This document analyses selected issues, effects and implications of the Cotonou 
agreement on Caribbean economies.
The document is structured in seven sections. The first section describes the origins of the 
Cotonou agreement. The second section addresses the main traits and mentions its five pillars
1. Introduction
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(the political dimension, the participatory approach, a strengthened focus on poverty reduction, 
development cooperation, trade and economic cooperation and financial aid).
The third section focuses on the protocols and more specifically on the sugar and banana 
protocols. It provides a description of the background to the protocols and a brief overview of the 
importance of sugar and bananas for Caribbean economies.
The fourth section centers on the negotiations between CARIFORUM and the European 
Union. It describes the status of the negotiations and examines the underlying differences in the 
approach taken by CARIFORUM and Europe.
The fifth section focuses on Europe’s Outermost Regions in the Caribbean and the 
Overseas Territories and Countries in the region that constitutionally depend on a member state 
of the European Union. The section explores the possible impacts of a Caribbean Cotonou 
Agreement for these countries and the issues for EPA negotiations related to Caribbean 
integration and collaboration.
The sixth section analyses the trade flows of goods and services between the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) and the EU the analysis is undertaken at the aggregate and country 
level. This section also comprises an analysis of competitiveness of CARICOM exports to the 
European Union using the software Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN).
The last section ascertains the potential impact of the tariff reduction scenarios 
contemplated by the EPAs using a static model, the SMART methodology, and a dynamic 
model, the Balance-of-payments constrained model (BPC model). The SMART methodology 
views the impact of tariff reduction on trade creation and trade deviation. The BPC model 
determines the impact of tariff reduction and export growth on the equilibrium rate of growth of 
selected Caribbean economies.
2. The origins of the Cotonou agreement
The cooperation between the EU and the ACP started with the Yaoundé Convention 
(1963 and 1969). It defined the way in which former European colonies were to be incorporated 
in the Community Policy established by the Treaty of Rome.
The inclusion of the United Kingdom into the EU and of its former colonies led to the 
overhaul of the Yaoundé Convention. Yaoundé was replaced by four successive Lomé 
Conventions, which provided the framework for trade and cooperation between the EU and ACP 
States from 1975 to 2000. The first Lomé Convention (1975) granted non-reciprocal market 
access for 84% of ACP countries’ agricultural exports to the EU, a stabilization mechanism for 
export prices (STABEX) and financial, technical and industrial cooperation mechanisms. The 
three Lomé Conventions that followed (1980, 1984 and 1989, respectively) amplified and 
expanded the scope of cooperation and asymmetrical treatment granted to ACP countries1 (See 
Box 3 in the Annex).
1 The first Lomé convention was signed in 1975. There followed Lomé II, Lomé III and Lomé IV signed in 1980, 1984, and 1989 
respectively. Between 1975 and 1995, the number of beneficiary increased from 45 to 70.It should be noted that while the Lomé
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Central to the spirit of the Lomé Conventions was the incorporation of special protocols 
that provided free market access at guaranteed prices for selected ACP agricultural products 
(sugar, beef, rum and banana) to the European market. The protocols reflected the central role 
that the Lomé Conventions attributed to raw materials. Their provisions were meant to offset the 
effects of the protectionist measures (quantitative restrictions and other measures) granted by the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to European agricultural products.
This model of cooperation between the EU and ACP countries became at odds with the 
global trend of trade liberalization and the strengthening of a multilateral approach, especially 
with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The generally poor performance of 
ACP countries was another strong reason for overhaul of the model. The deepening and 
widening of European integration, including the revision of the Treaty in 2001, finally made 
thorough revision a matter of urgency.
The acceptance of free trade coincided with a wealth of empirical evidence accumulated 
since the 1970s highlighting the virtues of outward relative to inward oriented integration2 and 
was reflected in the Uruguay-General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) Round of 
negotiations and commitments (1986-1994).
Following the Uruguay Round, the distinction between developed and developing 
economies became framed in terms of ‘adjustment costs’ (Fukasako, 2000). Developing 
countries had greater adjustment costs than developed countries in complying with the rules of 
an international trade body. The emphasis on free trade and adjustment costs signaled a clear 
move away from non-reciprocity, which was a fundamental principle of the Lomé Conventions.
Paraphrasing Michalopulos (2000), the most fundamental change brought about by the 
Uruguay Round was to replace the exception to reciprocity granted to developing economies 
with the recognition that there are adjustment costs for these economies, but that these must be 
dealt with ‘within reciprocity.’3
The performance of ACP countries also emerged a source of concern during the Lomé IV 
period and was clearly highlighted in the European Commission’s Green Paper (1986).
Lomé IV recognized that the debt situation of ACP countries had worsened and viewed 
aid as an obstacle to development and economic reform (Tamames, 1996). As a result, the 
European Community tied a portion of its financial aid to the undertaking and implementation of 
structural reform.
Convention is non-reciprocal; ACP States cannot discriminate among EU member States. In other words, any benefits relating to 
tariffs or non-tariff barriers granted by a member State of the EU to an ACP State must be granted to similar imports from the 
other EU member States (OAS, 1996 p. 58).
2 The standard work cited in this literature is I . Little, T Scitovsky, M Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Study (1970).
3 Perhaps the general acceptance of this viewpoint was also influenced by the perception that a multilateral trade agreement such 
as GATT could favor the interests of developing economies. The Uruguay Round strengthened the dispute settlement 
mechanism, extended the coverage of trade negotiating areas (agriculture and textiles) and widened the market access to 
developed country markets through the elimination of voluntary export restraints.
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The European Community’s Green Paper went further and questioned the effectiveness 
of aid and, more generally, the foundations of asymmetrical treatment in trade relations.
The Green Paper asserted the difficulty of assessing the impact on a country’s social and 
economic conditions. In particular it argued that the impact of aid was highly dependent on the 
internal conditions of countries.4 Nonetheless, it stated in clear terms that domestic policy reform 
was a pre-condition for aid-effectiveness:
Even though a great number of projects financed by the Union have proved 
positive and effective...they have not automatically led to improvements in the 
country’s development indicators. Without incentive policies, dynamic sectoral 
institutions and sufficient funding to cover operating and maintenance costs, the 
viability of aid remains precarious. This fact is reflected by a tendency for 
international aid to focus on the countries that seem best able to use it effectively, 
which at the moment are those undergoing structural adjustment. (Chapter II,
p.12).
In respect of asymmetrical treatment, the Green Paper emphasized that trade preferences 
did not improve ACP countries export performance. During the Lomé Conventions, ACP market 
share declined from 7% in 1976 to 3% in 1998 (Barthe, 2003, p.65). In addition, leaving aside a 
few success stories, countries did not manage to diversify exports.
The underlying explanation included the existence of binding supply constraints, 
dependency on commodities that are subject to high price fluctuations, and the deterioration of 
the terms of trade. Most important the poor export performance was due to the absence of 
‘sound’ domestic policies. Sound domestic policies included among others, macroeconomic 
stability, realistic and stable exchange rates, good institutions and governance, stable and credit 
import and taxation regimes, and reduced trade protection (EU, Green Paper, 1996, pp.17-18).
The Cotonou agreement (2000) replaces the Lomé agreement and is valid for a period of 
20 years with periodic revisions every five years. The Cotonou agreement overhauls the trade 
relations between the European Community and ACP States. Contrary to the Lomé ‘spirit’, The 
Cotonou agreement envisages trade relations founded upon the progressive dismantling of trade 
barriers and preferences integrating ACP countries into the multilateral system and making the 
European Union-ACP trade relation WTO compatible. Also, the ACP-wide approach is 
abandoned for region-specific agreements which bring into focus the objective of strengthening 
regional economic integration among groups of ACP-countries and with their neighbouring 
economies.
3. The main traits of the Cotonou agreement
The main objective of the new partnership agreement is the ‘eradication of poverty in a 
consistent manner with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of
4 As put in the Green Paper (Chapter II, p.12): “ ... the institutional and economic policy situation in the recipient countries has 
been a major constraint, reducing the impact of aid operations.”
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the ACP countries in the world economy.’5 The agreement comprises four distinguishing 
features. First, it incorporates the political dimension in the negotiations. Second, it envisages a 
participatory approach incorporating the different sectors of society in the consultative and 
decision-making process. Third, it places a strengthened focus on poverty reduction through 
social and economic development and the deepening of regional integration. Fourth, it overhauls 
the principle of non-reciprocity which formed the basis for trade relations in the Lomé 
conventions (See Box 4 in the Annex).
The political dimension plays a pivotal role in the Cotonou agreement since the 
partnership includes a number of wide issues ranging from economic and social issues to peace 
building, conflict prevention and resolution matters. Partners in the agreement agree to 
‘regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to 
commitments on both sides.’6 The dialogue can take place in formal or informal settings and at 
different geographical levels to ensure its continuity and flexibility. 7
Some of the issues addressed in the Partnership such as the respect for human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law were emphasized in the revised Lomé IV Convention. 
Nevertheless, an essential new element, which underpins the partnership is good governance, and 
in particular the fight against corruption.8
The Cotonou agreement also stresses that cooperation must be exercised through a 
greater level of participation by the different actors and sectors of society. The new agreement 
highlights the importance of the non-governmental segments of society. Economic and social 
actors and the civil society are expected to be involved in the design, consultation and 
implementation of development strategies and programmes. In particular, the agreement 
underscores the importance of the private sector and the need to define criteria guiding the scope 
of participation of the different non-State actors.
Thirdly, as noted previously, the Cotonou agreement places strengthened emphasis on 
poverty eradication. The approach followed in the agreement is cognizant of the complex nature 
of poverty and proposes a comprehensive strategy for development. It stresses three priority 
areas of cooperation: economic development, social and human development, and regional 
integration and cooperation. The agreement also stresses that ‘cooperation and priorities shall 
vary according to a partner’s level of development, its needs performance and long-term 
development strategy.’
Finally, the reform of the trading arrangements represents the most radical change 
contained in the agreement with respect to the previous model of cooperation between the 
European Union and ACP countries.
To ensure full conformity with the WTO rules, EPAs will replace the current non­
reciprocal trade arrangements. The new trading arrangements plan the progressive removal of
5 Cotonou Agreement, Article 1, p.7.
6 Cotonou Agreement, Article 8, p.13.
7 Cotonou Agreement, Article 8, p. 15
8 Cotonou Agreement, Article 9, p. 16.
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barriers to trade and enhance cooperation in areas relevant to trade.9 They also provide the basis 
for the establishment of a free trade area with the EU. The trade negotiations started in 2002 and 
are still in process. The EPAs will enter into force in January 2008, but a transitional period of at 
least 12 years will provide for the progressive removal of trade barriers.
The Cotonou agreement recognizes the principle of differentiation as the levels of 
development and the different needs of the countries are also taken into account. Thus, the least­
developed countries (LDC) will be able to continue receiving non-reciprocal trade preferences and 
from 2005 on, they will benefit from duty free access to the EU market for essentially all their 
products. The future trade cooperation also comprises other areas linked with trade such as 
competition policy, trade and labour standards.
More specifically Part 5 of the Cotonou Agreement also contains specific provisions for 
the Least Developed, Landlocked and Island States (LDLIC). Article 84 specifies that ACP-EU 
cooperation will ensure special treatment for these countries, taking into account their particular 
economic vulnerability. With respect to island States, which include the Caribbean, the 
Agreement provides for specific provisions and measures to be established to assist these 
countries in their efforts to overcome “the natural and geographic difficulties and other 
obstacles” to their development (Cotonou Agreement, Article 89).10
The objective of the type of trade cooperation emphasized in the agreement is to promote the 
gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy. 11 To this end, the agreement puts great 
emphasis on the need to build a competitive private sector, enhance the capacity to attract foreign 
investment and improve the diversification of production. The agreement also highlights the 
strengthening of regional integration initiatives as a precondition for future trade cooperation.
The agreement argues that the move towards a free-trade area will bring benefits, such as the 
benefit of cheaper EU imports, but it also recognises that the ACP States may also have to face major 
challenges.
The EU applies very low or zero tariffs on most of its imports from ACP countries so that 
the effect of the removal of trade barriers on the external sector or for fiscal performance is 
bound to be modest. In other words the costs of trade liberalization for the EU are minor.
Contrarily ACP States will have to face the full force of global competition. As a result, 
they must use the preparatory period to modernize their economies and become more 
competitive. The transformation of their economies will require major adjustment costs in some 
cases. To address the challenges and constraints the ACP countries have to face, it is crucial to 
combine trade and economic policies with social development policies. From the point of view 
of the agreement, this should lead to economic growth and eventually poverty reduction.
The implementation of the new trading arrangements implies that the Lomé protocols 
need to be reviewed. The commodities exported under the protocols constitute in the cases of
9 Cotonou Agreement, Article 36, p.54.
10 Articles 2, 32,35,56,68, 84 and 89 contain provisions for Island States.
11 Commission of the European Communities: Green Paper, p. xiii
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some Caribbean countries the major exports to the European Union. As stated by the Council of 
the European Union, the Cotonou Agreement commits the ACP and the Community to review all 
the protocols in the context of the negotiations on EPAs.12 In this regard article 36(4) of the 
agreement states:
. .the Parties reaffirm the importance of the commodity protocols.. .They agree on 
the need to review them in the context of the new trading arrangements, in 
particular as regards their compatibility with WTO rules, with a view to 
safeguarding the benefits derived there from, bearing in mind the special legal 
status of the Sugar Protocol.”
Finally the Cotonou agreement drastically reduces and simplifies the mechanisms of 
financial aid to ensure a greater degree of efficiency and flexibility.13As stated in the agreement, 
the resources of the European Development Fund (EDF) will be channeled through two 
instruments: the Grant Facility and the Investment Facility. The Grant Facility will finance a 
wide range of long-term operations including macroeconomic support and sectoral policies. The 
dependency of stable export earnings in the agricultural and mining sector will also be taken into 
account and lead to granting supplementary resources within the Community Support Strategy. 
This system replaces the previous instruments, Stabex and Sysmin. The Investment Facility 
replaces the Lomé IV risk capital. It is meant to foster private sector development, providing risk 
capital and loans.
Furthermore the Cotonou Agreement introduces a system of “rolling programming”, 
which entrusts the ACP countries with enhanced responsibility. The allocation of resources is 
now based on the different needs and performances of the countries and will no longer be an 
automatic right. The allocation criteria take into account the partnership’s primary objectives, 
such as successful implementation of reforms and poverty reduction. The amount of 
development aid to the ACP States is always set for a five-year period reflecting the overriding 
goal for greater flexibility in the cooperation between ACP countries and the European Union.
12 Council of the European Union. Annex to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime. 27 June 2005.
13 Commission of the European Communities: Green Paper, p. xiv
11
4.1 The sugar protocol15
4.1.1. The background
ACP countries became an integral part of the European sugar policy through the 
signature of the Sugar Protocol (28 February 1975). The Sugar Protocol has been attached to the 
Lomé Agreement and is now annexed to the Cotonou Agreement.16
The Protocol guarantees ACP countries access to the EU market for fixed quantities of 
sugar at preferential prices over an indefinite period of time. Thus, the signatory ACP States can 
import 1.3 million tonnes of white and raw sugar per year into the EU duty-free and at 
guaranteed prices.17 Article 5(4) of the Sugar Protocol states, that the guaranteed prices shall be 
negotiated annually. The Protocol is of indefinite duration ensuring its continuous application 
and independence relative to any agreement, to which it is annexed. 18
The sugar protocol was designed to minimize the adverse effects and distortions resulting 
from the subsidies granted to European sugar producers under the CAP. Thus, through price 
stability and guaranteed market access the sugar protocol aims to ensure a fair income to former 
European colonies. The current price levels for European and ACP sugar producers are three 
times higher than world market prices.19 This encourages some of the ACP sugar countries to 
export as much of their production as possible to the EU.
In 1995, the EU introduced the agreement on Special Preferential Sugar (SPS). If 
European refineries cannot be supplied sufficient quantities via the Sugar Protocol, an additional 
duty-free import for raw cane sugar from the ACP countries and India can be demanded. This 
quota is usually around 150 000 tonnes.20
4. The protocols14
14 Rice is another important commodity exported by CARICOM countries, mainly Guyana and Suriname. Although not subject 
to a protocol trade in rise is regulated by a tariff-quota regime. Guyana and Suriname share a quota.
15 The countries included in the sugar protocol are Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Fiji, Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe).
16 The European sugar policy dates back to 1968 and is part of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). The aims and principles 
of the CAP, including the sugar policy, are set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome: (i) to increase agricultural productivity, 
(ii) to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, (iii) to stabilize markets, (iv) to assure availability of 
supplies, and (v) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. These aims and principles are ensured to European 
sugar producers by support prices, production quotas to limit over-production and subsidies to export surplus production out of 
the European Union (EU). The EU sugar policy embraces both beet and cane sugar production.
17 European Commission, June 2005: The European Sugar Sector, 4. Sugar: EU and developing countries, p.1
18World sugar production has more than doubled since the 1960s, but the EU's share in production, consumption and exports has 
decreased. The EU is still a major player on the world sugar market, but over the last ten years, Brazil and India have gained 
market share. The EU remains now far behind Brazil, the leading sugar exporter.
European Commission, June 2005: The European Sugar Sector, 3. European sugar in figures, p.4
19 European Commission, June 2005: The European Sugar Sector, 2. A sustainable future for the EU sugar regime, p. 1
20 European Commission, June 2005: The European Sugar Sector, 4. Sugar: EU and developing countries, p.1
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In 2001, the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) agreement was signed.21 It abolishes almost 
all tariffs for products imported into the EU from 50 LDCs, including six of the ACP sugar 
countries. The agreement states, that the abolition of tariffs is limited to a tariff quota of raw cane 
sugar for refining. The SPS quota for ACP countries is reduced by the amount to which the EBA 
sugar quota declines.
The current sugar regime ends on the 30 June 2006.22 Due to several reasons, a reform of 
the European sugar policy, including the Sugar Protocol, was thought to be unavoidable. For one 
thing, the EU imposes prices on sugar that are above those applied at the international level (see 
figure 1 below) the trend towards global trade liberalization has also encouraged the 
restructuring of the sugar regime. Thus, in 1995, the Uruguay round emphasized the WTOs 
commitment to reinforce the liberalization of agriculture markets.
Finally, another major reason for reforming is the case brought against the EU to the 
WTO Appellate Body by Australia, Thailand and Brazil in February 2004. The WTO ruled that 
the EU exceeded its export subsidy commitments since it exports up to 1.6 million tonnes of 
subsidized sugar annually equivalent to its preferential imports of ACP countries and India, 
without deducting them of its export subsidy limits.
4.1.2 The proposed reform of the sugar protocol
The EU proposed two packages (July 2004 and June 2005) for the reform of the sugar 
protocol.
The July (2004) reform package includes the following features: (i) a 33% reduction over 
three years in the preferential price that the EU pays to ACP sugar protocol countries for the 
purchase of up to 1.3 million tons of sugar per year; (ii) the reduction in price would start on 1 
July 2005 with an initial price cut of 20% to be followed by further price cuts of 8% and 5%, 
respectively; (iii) the refiners’ margin which is currently paid by the EU would be transferred to 
ACP sugar producers; (iv) the EU would accompany the price cuts by specific measures, starting 
in 2007, destined to assist ACP sugar producers to diversify to other sectors of economic 
activity or improve their current level of competitiveness in the sugar sector; (v) the EU sugar 
producers will continue to receive direct income support of 60% through a decoupled payment.
ACP member States have voiced opposition to the reform package on the basis that the 
proposed price cuts are too large. More important ACP member States have argued that the 
reform package is contrary to the spirit of the ACP/EU sugar protocol which provided a 
guaranteed market and guaranteed prices. Finally, member States have noted that the reform 
package discriminates against sugar producers as it benefited beet producers. The ACP lobbying 
efforts have managed thus far to push back the date of implementation of the reform package and 
speed up the accompanying measures.
21 European Commission, June 2005: The European Sugar Sector, 4. Sugar: EU and developing countries, p.1
22 European Commission, June 2005: The European Sugar Sector, 2. A sustainable future for the EU sugar regime, p. 1
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The June 2005 package proposal imposes further cuts on the price of sugar. The sugar 
price would decline by 39%. In addition the current proposal includes the following measures: 
‘(i) the EU regime will be prolonged until the end of the years 2014/2015 without a review of 
price and quota levels in 2008. The quota levels may change thereafter; (ii) the proposal does not 
contemplate any compulsory quota cuts; (iii) a restructuring scheme providing a high degressive 
per-tonne restructuring aid for factory closures and quota renunciation, plus a top-up payment to 
ensure sugar beet growers the possibility of receiving the full, final direct payment, in the event 
that they abandon production when the factory with which they have sugar beet delivery rights 
closes under the restructuring scheme.’23
More recently in November the EU has decided to move ahead with a 36% price 
reduction over the next four years beginning in 2006/2007. Among other measures, the EU also 
decided: (i) to compensate farmers at an average of 64.2% of the loss due to the price cut; (ii) 
that countries giving up at least 50% of their quota will receive a payment of 30% for the loss in 
income up to five years; (iii) the new regime will last until 2014/2015; (iv) the abolition of the 
current intervention price system and its replacement by a reference price; (v) to implement a 
voluntary restructuring scheme lasting four years for EU sugar factories; (vi) the creation of a 
diversification fund for EU member States where the quota is reduced by a minimum amount.
23 The Commission of European Communities, Reforming the European Union’s sugar policy. Update of impact assessment 
[SEC(2003) 1022]. Brussels, 22.6.2005. SEC(2005) 808.
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Currently 20 ACP countries export sugar under the Sugar Protocol.24 With India the EU 
has an identical agreement, allowing it to export 10 000 tons of sugar per year. The main 
exporter of sugar to the European Union is Mauritius accounting for 25% of the market share. 
For some ACP States, sugar is an important contributor to economic growth. In some States, 
sugar exports under the Protocol amount to no less than 25% of GDP, and about 85% of total 
agricultural exports.25
The Caribbean's major sugar producers, apart from Cuba which is not an ACP country, 
the Dominican Republic and Haiti which are not signatories to the ACP sugar protocol, are 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St Kitts Nevis, Guyana, Barbados and Belize. Caribbean ACP 
protocol signatory countries represent 28% of the EU import market share. At the individual 
country level, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, Belize and Barbados represent 11%, 8%, 3%, 3% and 
2% of the EU import market share. According to Garside at al (2005) based on 2000-2002 
figures, the European Union’s market receives 84% of all sugar exports from Caribbean protocol 
signatory countries. The Caribbean receives 33% of all sugar quotas.26
For the most part, Caribbean preferential sugar producers have production costs that 
exceed the international levels. Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago 
are amongst the highest cost producers (ranking 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th among all ACP countries). In 
addition, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago exhibit the highest 
combination of dependency levels (measured by commodity exports as a percentage of the total) 
and production costs (cost of US$ cents per pound) (See figures 1 and 2 below).Finally, 
Caribbean countries exhibit levels of productivity (measured by the ratio of volume of 
production to harvested area) and profitability (measured by the ratio of government revenue to 
production costs) which are below the average for ACP countries (See Table 1 below).
Among Caribbean sugar protocol countries, Guyana is the most important sugar 
producer, generating 14% of GDP, more than 10% of employment and 26% of its export 
earnings (See Table 1 below). Guyana also has the third largest EU sugar quota. Sugar is also 
important to Belize as it contributes 10% of GDP, 24% of export earnings and 13% of its labor 
force. 27
In the case of the rest of the countries sugar is not a fundamental contributor to GDP or 
employment. For Barbados, Belize, Jamaica and St. Kitts and Nevis, sugar represents at most 2% 
of GDP and less than 5% of the workforce. Nonetheless, sugar provides export earnings that are 
significant in the case of St. Kitts and Nevis and non-negligible in the case of Jamaica (56% and 
7% of commodity exports). Nonetheless, the EU provides the largest and most lucrative market 
for sugar exports.28
4.1.3 The dependency of the Caribbean on sugar exports to the EU
24 European Commission, June 2005: The European Sugar Sector, 4. EU and developing countries, p. 1
25 www.ACPsugar. org : Sugar Facts & Figures
26 Sugar milling is mostly government owned. The exception is Belize where a foreign firm owns 10% of milling and workers 
own 90% of production. See, Garside et al. (2005).p.17.
27 www.ACPsugar. org : Sugar Facts & Figures
28 European Commission, May 2002: The Caribbean and the European Union, p. 30 and p. 38
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T a b le  1
C a rib b ea n  su g a r  p ro d u c ers  an d  ex p o rte rs  
D e p e n d e n c y  on  su g a r  
2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 4
C o u n tr ie s C o n tr ib u tio n  
o f  su g a r  
to  G D P  
2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 4
C o n tr ib u tio n  
o f  su gar  
to
co m m o d ity
ex p o rts
ea r n in g s
19 9 0 -2 0 0 4
N u m b e r  o f  
em p lo y ee s  
20 0 3
C o n tr ib u tio n  
o f  su gar  
to
em p lo y m e n t
20 0 3
C o n tr ib u tio n  o f  su g a r  
to  g o v er n m e n t  
rev en u e  
2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 4
P ro d u c tiv ity
2 0 0 3
P ro fita b ility
20 0 3
Barbados 2.4 17.0 2,000-2,300 1.8 0.0 6.00 0.68
Belize 10 24.0 10,000-11,000 12.8 0.7 5.13 2.47
Guyana 13.6 26.1 22,000-24,000 >10.0 1.7 6.46 6.37
Jamaica 1.0 6.8 31,000-33,000 3.0 0.0 5.31 2.90
St. Kitts and Nevis 2.0 55.7 1,000-2,000 0.0 5.25 0.22
Trinidad and Tobago 0.5 0.5 24,000-26,000 >4.0 0.0 3.74 0.78
Average ACP 8.8 38,321 0.5 7.42 15.7
Note:
N.A. denotes not available.
Productivity is the ratio of production volume and harvested area. Profitability is the ratio of government revenue to production costs. 
Source: On the basis of official data and TARIC (2005); European Commission Reports; Gaside et al. (2005) and LMC International (2005).
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4.2.1 The evolution of the banana regime
The primary purpose of the Banana Protocol under the first Lomé Convention was to 
safeguard the import of ACP bananas into the EU market. The establishment of the first banana 
regime in 1993 provided a definite content for the protocol.
The regime consisted of a system of tariff and tariff preferences (for ACP countries) and 
quotas. The principal aims of the banana regime were to harmonize the banana market, permit 
free movement of bananas within the EU and ensure adequate incomes for EU producers and for 
traditional ACP suppliers as well as guarantee fair prices for consumers.29 The regime consisted 
of:
(a) A quota of 2 million tonnes of bananas for Latin American countries (dollar 
bananas) and non-traditional ACP States;
(b) A quota of 857,000 tonnes free of duty for imports from traditional ACP 
countries;
(c) A license system which distinguished between operators marketing EU-produced 
and ACP-produced bananas (Category ‘B ’ licenses) and operators in the EU marketing bananas 
from non-traditional ACP- and Latin American countries (Category ‘A ’ licenses). Category ‘C’ 
licenses were established for new operators marketing non-traditional ACP bananas and dollar 
bananas; and
(d) A within quota duty of € 100 per tonne for bananas from Latin America.
The regime was challenged several times by Latin American countries and the United 
States, which felt discriminated by the treatment granted to the traditional ACP banana suppliers. 
The banana regime was amended three times, leading to an erosion of ACP preferences.
In 1994, following a resolution of a dispute panel, the EU increased the quota for Latin 
American countries and non-traditional ACP countries to 2.1 million tones in 1994 and 2.2 
million tones in 1995. Further, duties on these quotas were reduced to € 75 per tone. Following 
the EU enlargement, an additional quota of 353,000 for the dollar banana countries and non- 
traditional ACP countries was introduced.
In 1997, the banana regime was further revised. A new scheme, implemented in 1999, 
was based on a 2.353 million tones tariff quota for Latin American and non-traditional ACP 
countries. Moreover, it contained the removal of country-specific allocations under the 
traditional ACP quota, thus putting more importance on competitiveness. An additional change 
included the abolition of the operator categories established in the original regime, which
4.2 The banana protocol
29 N ationa l Econom ic Research Associates (w w w .nera.com ): Nerareport, p. 16
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removed the former incentive for importers to buy from traditional ACP States (see Boxes 5 and
6).
In April 2001, the EU finally reached a new resolution in discussion with the main critics 
of the banana regime. The resulting agreement consisted of a two-phased regime, which did not 
affect the duty free status of ACP countries. The first phase, operative for six months until the 
end of 2001, established three tariff-quotas to imports from all sources:
(a) Quota ‘A ’: 2.2 million tones at a tariff of € 75 per ton;
(b) Quota ‘B ’: 353 000 tones at a tariff of € 75 per ton; and
(c) Quota ‘C’: 850 000 tones at a tariff of € 75 per ton.
The second stage was introduced in January 2002. It involved three major changes:
(a) The ‘B ’ Quota was increased by 100,000 tonnes with a corresponding decrease of 
the quota of the ACP countries (Quota ‘C’);
(b) From 1 January 2004 onwards, the traditional operators’ entitlement to license is 
based on usage of licenses issued under the new system; and
(c) The tariff-quota and license system were expected to come to an end by January 
2006 and replaced by a tariff-only regime consisting of the application of a bound duty of 230 
Euros per metric tonne.
The decision to move to tariff only regime has not been satisfactory to the Most Favoured 
Nations (MFN) or ACP countries. For the EU the main issue is whether or not the tariff 
equivalent reduces the market access level provided to MFN countries. MFN countries have 
argued that the tariff only regime as currently proposed maintains the discrimination against 
Latin American banana producers. ACP countries on their part have highlighted the difficulty in 
determining the tariff equivalent of a tariff quota regime. Furthermore, they have argued that the 
230 EU per metric ton seriously understates the level of protection provided under the tariff 
quota regime. Finally, they have noted that there is a margin between the highest level of tariff 
that the EU could have proposed and the actual level of tariff proposed while at the same time 
preserving market access for MFN countries.30
30 The rebinding of the concession for bananas at 230 Euros per metric tones was subject to an arbitration procedure “to 
determine whether the envisaged rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas would result in at least maintaining total market access for 
MFN banana suppliers.” The arbitration procedure was “initiated pursuant to the procedures set out in the Annex to the waiver 
decision respect to Article I of the GATT (14 November 2001).” The negative answer of the arbitrator and the arbitrators concern 
over the “impact of the ACP supply response on the market access opportunities of MFN suppliers” led the European Union to 
revise its proposal and provide a an MFN tariff of 187 Euros per metric ton and a tariff quota for ACP countries of 775,000 
metric tons per year at zero duty. See,
WTO (2005) European Communities-The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement-Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Decision of 
14 November 14. WT/L/616. and WT/L/625.
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The largest banana importers are the United States with 30% of world banana imports, 
followed by the EU (26%) and Japan (8%).31 The majority of EU banana imports in the period 
2000-2002 originated from Latin America (63%) and ACP countries (18%). Compared to the 
increase in demand for bananas in the world market, the rise of the total amount of EU banana 
imports has risen at a slow pace (2.7%) since the establishment of the regime in 1993. EU 
domestic imports and imports from Latin American banana countries increased slightly while the 
imports of ACP suppliers have remained stable. 32
Banana exports from ACP countries are destined entirely to the EU and the overall 
majority of Caribbean ACP bananas (from Belize, Jamaica, Suriname and the four Windward 
Islands of Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines) are imported by 
the UK.
4.2.2 Trends in banana exports
T a b le  2
E u ro p ea n  U n io n  im p o r ts  o f  b a n a n a s ( in c l.  p la n ta in s , fre sh  or d r ie d )
2 0 0 3
M a r k e t  
sh a re  b y  
co u n tr y
V a lu e  in  
E u ro
S h a re  o f  
E x tra -  
E U to n n es
P r ic e / k g  
in  E u ro*
Jamaica 4.10% 21,788,000 1.00% 41.784 0.52
Surinam n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Belize 41.40% 37,010,000 1.80% 73.806 0.50
Saint Lucia 88.90% 20,980,000 1.00% 32.520 0.65
St. Vincent 9.00% 13,481,000 0.60% 20.919 0.64
Dominica 37.60% 6,865,000 0.30% 10.823 0.63
ACP countries 1.70% 486,422,000 23.10% 790.660
2 0 0 4
Jamaica 1.80% 11,301,000 0.50% 28.660 0.39
Surinam 3.50% 6,001,000 0.20% 19.277 0.31
Belize 44.40% 35,164,000 1.40% 80.292 0.44
Saint Lucia 88.60% 27,909,000 1.10% 42.874 0.65
St. Vincent 6.30% 15,737,000 0.60% 23.969 0.65
Dominica 47.30% 8,135,000 0.30% 12.401 0.65
Nonetheless significant shifts within the ACP banana countries have taken place since the 
establishment of the banana regime. In 1993, the Caribbean ACP countries provided 374,000 
tonnes of bananas- almost half the total of all ACP countries (748,000 tonnes). In 2002, they 
supplied only 185,000 tones (25%).33 The difference is accounted for by the increase of the 
African ACP countries and the Dominican Republic.
31 Nerareport, p. 11
32 Nerareport, p. 12
33 Nerareport, p. 12
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Also since the adoption of the banana regime, all ACP countries have suffered an erosion 
of their preferences in favour of benefits for cheaper banana producer countries. The major 
reasons are the expansion of quota for Latin American and non-traditional ACP countries, the 
ending of the operator categories, which supported EU imports from traditional ACP countries 
and the movement from individual quotas for ACP countries to a global ACP quota. The 
Caribbean ACP countries can be considered to be the most banana-dependent of the ACP 
countries. Thus, they have been especially hard hit by the banana reforms, particularly the 
Windward Islands and Jamaica.
Statistics for all Caribbean ACP banana suppliers show, that over the last decade there 
has been a substantial fall of banana exports (in volume) and export revenues to the EU, and 
particularly to the United Kingdom market. Further, a sharp decrease in retail prices and a 
significant reduction of banana growers can be seen. Only imports of Belize have been fairly 
constant. Suriname had a substantial increase in exports until 2002, when its banana-export 
company went bankrupt and thus its exports sharply declined. For its part, the Dominican 
Republic witnessed a sharp increase in banana exports (See Table 3 below).
Jamaica and the Winward Islands have experienced a decrease of 50% and of 15%, 
respectively in their average banana exports before and after the implementation of the first 
banana regime. This has also had negative consequences on employment in the Windward 
Islands. The number of registered banana farmers dropped from 24,000 in 1993 to just over
7,000 in 2000 and production in the same period fell from 242,000 tonnes to 85,000 tonnes.34 In 
2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported, that “recent development in the 
international banana market has brought into question the viability of the Windward Island 
banana industry” .35
The EU has applied three financial instruments to facilitate the restructuring of banana 
industries especially affected by preference erosion. A major source of assistance was the 
STABEX system -  an income compensation to meet the loss of export earnings. Since 1995, 
considerable amounts of the STABEX allocations have been used for each of the Windward 
Islands.
This instrument is now replaced by the FLEX instrument of the Cotonou Agreement. In 
1994, the EU established a Special System of Assistance (SSA), the objective of this system was 
to help banana suppliers to restructure to meet the challenge of improved access for non-ACP 
countries. The SSA was followed by a 10 -year Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) in 1999. 
This instrument aims to improve competitiveness by increased productivity and moreover, 
support diversification in the agricultural sector. The SFA provides income support like 
STABEX and additionally, technical assistance. All seven banana countries have been granted 
considerable amounts of the SFA.
34 Nerareport, p. 40
35 Nerareport, p. 42
22
Table 3
Banana export performance indicators 
1990 - 2002
























1990 13.40 5.96 5.11 52.13 7.45 282 n.a. 227 1.14 100
1991 14.31 5.73 3.89 41.10 10.43 230 n.a. 274 1.19 98.4
1992 13.76 5.50 5.14 40.00 13.39 280 n.a. 238 1.06 84.7
1993 11.76 4.27 5.80 23.97 9.01 242 24.1 169 0.96 75.4
1994 13.55 5.88 8.38 32.80 13.90 169 23 191 0.94 72.2
1995 13.66 4.55 6.67 31.22 13.33 194 20.2 191 0.8 59.4
1996 13.19 3.85 7.70 20.15 10.22 191 18 137 0.89 64.5
1997 11.96 4.50 6.52 21.12 18.63 137 16.3 141 1 70.2
1998 8.28 2.80 6.01 17.76 17.89 142 11.7 130 1.04 70.6
1999 7.12 4.52 6.30 19.86 22.74 131 12.6 140 1.02 68.2
2000 5.47 4.54 8.01 11.35 22.56 141 11.1 83 0.99 64.2
2001 5.83 3.93 6.37 13.55 33.20 85 7.3 99 1.08 68.9
2002 4.92 0.84 3.60 12.00 30.73 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.02 64.1
Note: Other Countries include Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras. 
Source: On the basis of NERA (2003)
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The Rum protocol allowed the entry of ACP rum products duty free to the European 
Union. Under the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989, only 
restricted amounts of both aged brown rums and bulk white rum were allowed to enter the 
European market. These restrictions were put in place because of concerns over competition for 
the rum producers in the French overseas departments (Martinique, Guadeloupe and Reunion).
4.3 The rum protocol
Box 1 
Lome IV 1990-2000 
PROTOCOL 6 on Rum
Article 1
Until the entry into force of a common organization of the market in spirits, products of subheadings 2208 40 10, 2208 40 90, 
2208 90 11 and 2208 90 19 of the combined nomenclature originating in the ACP States shall be imported duty free into the 
Community under conditions such as to permit the development of traditional trade flows between the ACP States and the 
Community and between the Member States.
Article 2
(a) For the purposes of applying Article 167 and by the derogation from Article 168 (1) of the Convention, the Community 
shall each year, until 31 December 1995, fix the quantities which may be imported free of customs duties. These quantities shall 
be established as follows:
- until 31 December 1993, on the basis of the largest annual quantities imported from the ACP States into the Community in the 
last three years for which statistics are available, increased, in the period until 31 December 1992, by an annual growth rate of 
37 % on the market of the United Kingdom and 27 % on the other markets of the Community.
However, the volume of the annual quantity shall in no case be less than 172 000 hectolitres of pure alcohol,
-for 1994 and 1995, the volume of the total quota shall in each case be equal to that of the previous year increased by 20 000 
hectolitres of pure alcohol.
(b)For the arrangements applicable from 1996, the Community shall establish, before 1 February 1995, on the basis of a report 
that the Commission will send to the Council before 1 February 1994, the modalities for the projected abolition of the 
Community tariff quota, taking into account the situation and prospects on the Community rum market and of the ACP States' 
exports.
(c) Where the application of point (a) hampers the development of a traditional trade flow between the ACP States and the 
Community, the Community shall take appropriate measures to remedy the situation.
(d) To the extent that the consumption of rum increases significantly in the Community, the Community undertakes to carry out 
a new examination of the annual rate of increase fixed by this Protocol.
(e) The Community declares itself prepared to conduct appropriate consultations before determining the measures provided for 
in (c).
(f) The Community further declares itself willing to seek with the ACP States concerned measures to allow an expansion of 
their sales of rum on the Community market.
Source: ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé. Official Journal L 229, 17/08/1991 
Official Journal L 025, 30/01/1976
In November 1996 the United States and the EU engaged in a round of trade discussions 
in Singapore which resulted in the EU agreeing to open its white spirits markets (such as gin and
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vodka) to the United States, which in turn allowed better access to its technology markets. The 
consequence of this is that the MFN clause governing world trade required that any concessions 
had to be offered to all exporters. This was a blow to the Caribbean rum product from markets 
such as Brazil, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, and estimates of losses to Caribbean producers 
stood at US$260 million per annum.
However, this in effect then abolished the quantitative restrictions imposed upon the 
Caribbean exporters and also reduced the dependency upon the European markets. The 2000 
Cotonou agreement was the formal end to the Rum Protocol under the Loma agreement as it 
recognized “the importance of the rum sector for the economic and social development of several 
ACP countries and regions and its major contribution in providing employment, export earnings 
and Government revenues.” It further established rum as “a value added agro-industrial ACP 
product ... [and] shall be imported ... duty free and without quantitative restrictions.”
More than this, the Agreement makes provisions for fair competition and that ACP rum 
products would not be disadvantaged or discriminated and offers grants financed by the EDF 
under ‘windows’ that are designed for modernization and upgrading of facilities, marketing and 
distribution, waste treatment and business plans.36
Barbados, Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are the main exporters 
of rum to the European Union. As a percentage of total external sales, rum exports have gained 
importance for the Bahamas, Barbados Contrary in the cases of Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago, exports of rum have lost importance as a percentage of total exports (see Table 4 
below).
T a b le  4
S e le c ted  C A R IC O M  co u n tr y  ex p o r ts  to  W este rn  E u ro p e
to ta l ex p o rts  
19 8 5 -2 0 0 2
as a p erc en ta g e  o f
1985 1990 1995 20 0 2
Bahamas 10.6 7.3 15.6 35.9
Barbados 1.6 2.8 3.6 9.2
Jamaica 6.0 5.0 2.8 2.5
Trinidad and Tobago 5.3 21.6 22.5 1.0
Guyana 3.0 3.4 3.1 3.1
Source: CAN (2005)
36 ECDPM. 2001. Cotonou Infokit: From Lomé to Cotonou (13). Maastricht: ECDPM.
The Courier ACP-EU. “Adding punch to the Caribbean Rum Industry.” No 198, May-June 2003. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/courier/index 198 en.htm
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5.1 The current status of the negotiations
With the Cotonou Agreement, ACP countries agreed to turn their non-reciprocal trading 
arrangement into fully reciprocal regional integration areas in the form of EPAs. ACP countries 
launched negotiations for EPAs in September 2002. The Caribbean region and the EC started the 
EPA negotiations in April 2004.
The EPAs timetable includes four phases (See Table 5 below). Phase 1 of the 
negotiations which was completed in September 2004 established the objectives of the EPAs. 
The EPAs are instruments whose objective is to: (i) facilitate the sustainable development and 
structural transformation of Caribbean economies; and to (ii) strengthen the regional integration 
process with CARIFORUM (RNM, 2005).
In accordance, the EPA negotiations are based on four principles. First, the EPAs 
“support and are built upon the regional integration process.” Second, EPAs should promote and 
be consistent with development objectives and priorities. Third, the EPAs should include special 
and differential treatment provisions to address the constraints to growth and development 
imposed on CARIFORUM countries by their small size. Finally, the EPAs should improve 
market access possibilities for CARIFORUM exports.38
5. The negotiations between CARIFORUM and Europe37
T a b le  5
P h a ses  an d  o b je ctiv es  o f  th e  E P A  n eg o tia tio n s
P h a ses T im e ta b le O b jectiv es
First phase April 2004-September 2004 Establish the concerns and interests of EPA 
negotiations
Second phase September 2004-September 2005 Establish the regional integration priorities to be 
supported and key areas of assistance prior to the 
entry in force of the EPAs.
Third phase September 2005-December 2006 Establish an agreement on the approach to trade 
liberalization.
Fourth phase January 2007-December 2007 Resolution on remaining areas of disagreement and 
definition of institutional framework for the 
implementation of EPAs.
Source: Humphrey (2005)
37 The EU and CARIFORUM are the negotiating partners. The Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) negotiates on behalf of 
CARIFORUM at technical and senior-officials level and prepares ministerial meetings. CARIFORUM refers to the 15 countries 
involved in the negotiations (CARICOM countries and the Dominican Republic).
38 Humphrey, E.L. EPAs: State of Play with the CARIFORUM-EC Negotiations. A briefing to the Committee on International 
Trade of the European Parliament (13 September, 2005).
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According to the RNM one of the main differences between Europe and CARIFORUM 
in this phase of the negotiation resided in the extent of the product coverage subject to trade 
liberalization in future agreements. The EC maintained that the threshold should be set at 90% of 
the traded products. Caribbean negotiators argued that the extent of product coverage subject to 
trade liberalization should be in correspondence with the level of development of the negotiating 
parties. The Caribbean’s current level of economic development does not warrant a product 
coverage threshold subject to free trade, which is equal to 90% of the total.
Phase II of the negotiations were completed in September 2005. They had two 
objectives:“(i) the definition of the economic space assuming commitments under an EPA; (ii) 
the identification of the regional priorities of CARIFORUM and secure support by Europe to 
assist with their implementation” (Ibid).
Phase II was termed a “qualified success.” It accomplished the identification of the 
respective economic spaces that will assume commitments under EPAs. During Phase II the 
priority areas to be supported by an EPA were also identified. However, tangible support by the 
European Union to assist with their implementation has not been secured.
Phase III will delineate the biregional market access commitments of both parts. More 
precisely the objectives are threefold: “i) to establish an agreement on the structure of EPA; ii) to 
consolidate the outcome of the discussion on the priority issues for CARIFORUM regional 
integration; iii) to define the approach to trade liberalization to be adopted in the negotiations.”39
The Phase III negotiations, which will focus on four areas, market access, services and 
investment, trade-related issues, and legal and institutional issues, will begin de facto  after the 
WTO Hong Kong ministerial (December 2005). The Hong Kong Ministerial meeting is bound 
to provide guidance on developmental issues, such as special and differential treatment, which 
are fundamental to the EPA negotiating process.
5.2. The differences in vision underlying the EPA negotiations
While both CARICOM and the European Union are in agreement with the basic 
principles of the Cotonou agreement there are differences between the EU and CARICOM’S 
approach to the EPAs.
According to the former, the Cotonou agreement must rigorously comply with the 
requirements of article XXIV of the WTO.40 As such, Europe views the EPAs as a tool to 
promote the development of its signatory members guided by the principles of reciprocity and
39 CRNM. News Release. September 28, 2005.
40Article XXIV authorizes customs unions and free trade zones as an exception to the principle of non-discrimination. The 
regional agreements and free trade zones are expected to remove barriers to trade with respect to the essential of the trade which 
originated in the constituting members of the customs union or free trade areas. Finally, Article XXIV seems concerned with 
avoiding the trade deviation effect of free trade areas or customs unions and explicitly states that in order to avoid trade deviation, 
tariff and/or other trade measures should be established at a level, which in their aggregate, does not make these more restrictive 
than those previously imposed by the individual members. In addition, Article XXIV also states that country members may 
maintain trade restriction among members of a trade agreement on the basis of GATT’s articles XI, XII, XIII, XV and XX.
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free trade. Free trade should improve ACP market access possibilities, stimulate investment and 
promote economic growth.
Contrarily, CARIFORUM understands trade liberalization as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for economic development. Trade liberalization must be applied and suited to the 
particular conditions of signatory member States. In the case of CARICOM the reduction in 
tariffs may translate into significant revenue losses thus hardening the fiscal constraint of 
governments. The erosion of preferential access is also bound to affect key products such as 
sugar and bananas that are a significant source of employment and livelihoods for some member 
States. CARIFORUM understands that the EPAs must be accompanied by asymmetric 
provisions and must be linked to development assistance.
From the point of view of CARIFORUM these asymmetric provisions should mirror 
those adopted within the WTO framework. In the WTO texts (1994) the concept of special and 
differential treatment is embodied in a set of provisions allowing developing countries greater 
flexibility in terms of obligations and time frames to overcome these so called ‘adjustment 
costs.’ These provisions are grouped under four headings. These are (i) those recognizing the 
interests of the least developed and developing countries; (ii) the measures that reduce or ease 
the rules and obligations that developing economies have to meet; (iii) the provisions providing 
for longer time-frames for the implementation of obligations; and (iv) the provisions for 
technical assistance (WTO, 1999c, p.225).41 (See also Box 2 below).
Box 2
___________________ A proposal for special and differential for smaller economies___________________
On the basis of WTO texts Richard Bernal grouped appropriate provisions specific to smaller economies can be 
grouped under seven headings:
1. A Lower Level Of Obligations
Smaller economies would be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their 
adjustment capacity, development, financial and trade needs, and their administrative and institutional capabilities for 
implementation. This should be negotiated on an issue-by-issue basis and where appropriate, and product-by-product basis.
2. Asymmetrically Phased Implementation Timetables
Given the smaller size of firms in smaller economies and the smaller scale of production and limited size of the market, 
export sectors will require a longer period of adjustment than larger firms and larger, more developed economies. Hence, there 
must be asymmetrically phased implementation of rules and disciplines, permitting a longer adjustment period for smaller 
economies. For example, in agricultural trade, in particular, food items, smaller economies should be allowed the flexibility to 
implement their commitments to reduction of protection and domestic support over a longer period than the implementation 
period prescribed for larger economies.
3. Best Endeavor Commitments
Both larger and smaller economies should commit to best endeavors in implementation of S&D treatment. (a) Larger 
economies should, wherever possible, provide measures and accept timetables, which provide consideration to smaller 
economies. For example, careful regard should be given by developed countries to the peculiar situation of smaller economies 
when considering the imposition of antidumping duties. Larger, more developed economies should be required to explore the 
possibility of constructive remedies (i.e. price undertakings) before imposing duties where these would affect the essential 
interests of smaller economies. (b) Where flexibility is provided there should be some criteria to assess the extent to which 
smaller economies are making adequate efforts, for example, when smaller economies have achieved “export competitiveness” in 
a given product they would be expected to phase out concessions over an extended period.
41 See, WTO. Special and Differential Treatment. Synopsis of WTO Agreements and Related Topics. MM/LIB/SYN4. 23 
October 2000 for a detailed list of the provisions of the WTO Agreements on Special and Differential Treatment.
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4. Exemptions From Commitments In Certain Areas
Given the vast disparities in size, the extremely smaller size of some economies and the human, financial and institutional 
cost involved in implementing new trade agreements such as the FTAA, smaller economies should be permitted some 
exemptions. This would not only address the question of disparities, but also avoid delays, which may occur because smaller 
economies, despite their best effort, were not able to meet certain requirements and timetables. For example, if, as is likely, 
exports subsidies are outlawed, smaller economies should be exempt from this requirement, or standardizing technical 
requirements through national organizations and participation in international standardization processes where these have no 
applicability because of lack of production or importation or exports. Where complete exemptions are not feasible, the minimis 
provisions would be helpful.
5. Flexibility In Application And Adherence Of Disciplines Under Prescribed Circumstances
Smaller economies are highly open economies and are therefore more susceptible to balance of payments problems. This is 
particularly the case for smaller developing countries where balance of payment deficits tends to be persistent because of their 
structural origins. For example, the FTAA process might consider balance of payment provisions such as those provided in 
Articles XII and XIII of the GATT. It should be noted that these provisions are not confined to any particular type of country but 
all members may avail themselves of the right resort to these provision under the circumstances prescribed. Smaller economies 
because of their vulnerability to balance of payment problems should be permitted additional facilities to enable them to (a) 
maintain sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able to grant the tariff protection required for the establishment of a 
particular industry, and (b) apply quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes which take full account of the 
continued high level of demand for imports likely to be generated by their programs of economic development.
6. Enabling Access To Mediation
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes is currently under review in light of the 
experiences of the past few years. The problems, which have been identified with, the operations of the dispute settlement 
mechanism include: (a) the limited capability of smaller countries to make use of the mechanism because of their inadequate 
expertise and institutional capacity to implement panel findings. (b) The high cost and administrative difficulties of using the 
dispute settlement mechanism.
7. Technical Assistance And Training
The promise of technical assistance to the smaller economies is now widely accepted. Such assistance could: -
(a) contribute to efforts by smaller economies to undertake the structural, institutional and legislative adjustment
(b) promote the development of adequate institutional capacity including training to improve their handling of negotiations, 
and implementation of the international trade agreements
(c) assist smaller economies in fulfilling their obligations under the various international agreements, in particularly 
commitments under the WTO
No trade agreement and no set of relevant and meaningful special and differential measures should be expected to rectify 
structural and market weaknesses at the national level. A special and differential framework such as that described is unlikely to 
generate welfare gains for smaller economies unless it is accompanied by internal policies aiming at reducing their vulnerability.
Source: Bernal, Richard L. “Smaller Economies in the WTO” Unpublished paper, 2001.
In addition CARIFORUM’s approach follows the principle of variable geometry, in view 
of the three streams of regional integration processes in existence within the region, which 
include the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the CARICOM Single Market and 
Economy (CSME) and the CARICOM-Dominican Republic free trade agreement. These three 
different trade agreements have different levels of integration. The OECS is a currency union, 
the CSME is an incomplete customs union, and the CARICOM-Dominican Republic is a free 
trade agreement in the making. Their coexistence has led CARIFORUM to ask for differentiation 
in the negotiations among its member states.
Finally, CARIFORUM has also stressed that the development and execution of EU- 
funded projects should precede the EPA agreements. Thus far, potential projects or areas for 
European Union funded projects have been identified in sanitary and phitosanitary measures, 
agriculture, competition policy, standards, trade facilitation and regional integration.
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Like the ACP countries that opted for independence in the second half of the twentieth 
century, which in Cotonou agreed to redefine the framework for their trade and cooperation 
relationship with the European Union, the countries and territories that continued, in one form or 
another, to depend politically on a European country, are involved in a process of redefinitions. 
These processes are necessarily intertwined because they are in a general sense affected by the 
global liberalization trend and the Doha round of WTO trade talks and, in a more direct way, 
they are both immersed in the evolution of the European Union’s integration and common 
foreign trade and development assistance policies and institutions. The possibility of non­
independent countries to participate in the EPAs is still under discussion but will be rather 
limited.
The processes are also closely linked because in the Caribbean region, ACP countries and 
their non-independent neighbors have many political, economic, social and cultural ties, arising 
from shared history and sometimes language, borders and institutions. They are, in one word, 
close. The type of relation of one group of countries to the European Union is bound to affect the 
other. This chapter assesses the stakes of non-independent countries in the Caribbean region’s 
EPAs.
The Caribbean countries, territories and regions that are somehow part of a member State 
of the EU, have many different political, legal and economic arrangements in place. The EU has 
recognized two categories.
6.1. The outermost regions
In the Caribbean, three French departments are recognized as outermost regions. They are 
Guadeloupe, French Guyana and Martinique.
Second, several sector policies should be highlighted. Regarding the Union’s sugar 
policy, the Commission sent the Council and Parliament in 2003 a communication in which it 
proposed to give the outermost regions a different treatment in the reform of the instruments, the 
precise contents of which remain to be specified. In the case of bananas, since 1993 the 
outermost regions benefited from compensatory aid for marketing, giving banana production a 
notable boost. Rice production in French Guyana, affected by the Community’s reduction of the 
intervention price but benefiting from income support of 177 Euros per ton, nevertheless receives 
special consideration because the “decoupling” measure, which cuts the link between support 
and production, will not be compulsory in this region. French Guyana also benefited from a 
scheme to compensate for additional costs entailed by isolation from the European market for the 
disposal of fisheries products. To finalize this illustrative sample of a long list of sector support 
programmes, the transport sector may be mentioned. The Commission has adopted a favorable 
approach to aid for the purchase of replacement of aircraft in the outermost regions, providing 
tax relief for investment in Air Caraibes for the purchase of new aircraft. In short, many if not all 
the European Union’s sector programmes have special clauses for outermost regions. Some have 
a direct bearing on what is being negotiated in the Caribbean EPAs.
6. Issues for non-independent Caribbean countries, territories and regions
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A third area of policies of particular interest in the context of the present paper refers to 
regional integration. Through the Interregional Community Initiative, strands B (transnational 
cooperation) and C (interregional cooperation), funds are available to promote integration of 
outermost areas into the regional geo-economic area. The Caribbean Interreg III programme 
(2000-2006) of Euro 24 million supports economic and social integration of the DOMs in the 
Caribbean area. The regional programme for the Caribbean of the European Development Fund, 
managed by CARIFORUM, finances joint measures between Departements d’outre-mer (DOMs) 
and Caribbean ACP countries.
This synopsis of European policies regarding its outermost regions, in this case the 
French Caribbean DOMs, underscores the notion that the negotiations of an EPAs between 
CARIFORUM and the European Union need to address the issue of CARIFORUM-DOM 
relations. There may be contentious issues, and the European Union has hinted at these by 
indicating that it will take into account the specific interests of the outermost regions. 
CARIFORUM countries may have reasonable arguments to request a special treatment to 
compensate for remoteness and insularity, similar to the benefits in place for DOMs, for 
example. If not, special support measures for DOMs maybe taken as obstacles in leveling the 
playing field for competition in certain industries. Sometimes these issues take a different spin, 
such as in the case of the proposed changes to the sugar protocol. The specific interests of 
outermost regions seem to align with those of the ACP countries in the sense that both groups 
support each other and requested special access to the European market to be preserved. The 
marginal position that both groups of countries have in each other’s economies should make it 
relatively easy to resolve the more contentious issues. In any case, a deepening of economic 
relations and more functional collaboration in areas such as international migration, protection of 
the environment, technical cooperation and the like should have positive impacts that by far 
outweigh possible negative consequences for particular industries in specific countries and 
regions.
6.2. Overseas countries and territories
Some countries or territories in the Caribbean depend constitutionally on a member State 
of the European Union, with varying degrees of autonomy. However, they are not part of the 
European Union and Community law does not apply to them. For seven of these, the relation to 
the European Union is set out in an association regime, contained in articles 182 to 188 of the 
European Community Treaty. Five are Overseas Territories (OT) of the United Kingdom 
(Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands)42. 
The remaining two Caribbean Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) are autonomous 
countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, namely Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. 
The latter country is a federation of five islands, each with a degree of island autonomy and 
differentiated policies.43
42 One OT of the United Kingdom, Bermuda, requested not to be included in the Association Treaty with the EC.
43 The seven countries or territories taken together have a total population of close to 400,000 inhabitants, about 1.5 times the 
population of Barbados, and the size of the combined economies is roughly comparable to the nominal GDP of Jamaica. The 
population of this OCT group is about 40% of the total population in Caribbean Outermost Regions, and its combined nominal 
GDP is about half. The economies of the Caribbean OCTs are based on tourism, ranging from mass cruise-ship and beach
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In order to assess the issues related to the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements and the OCTs it is necessary to take into account that OCTs may have different 
macroeconomic settings, trade regimes and production structures. Furthermore, in each OCT the 
process of redefining its relationship with the European Union has specific characteristics.
The Netherlands Antilles, the most populated and sizeable economy of the seven, 
provides undoubtedly the most complex situation.44
The country is currently in intense negotiations with the Government of the Netherlands 
about alternative political and constitutional arrangements. Referendums have been held and far- 
reaching proposals are on the table, the main one entailing a break-up of the five island 
federation. The populations of Curacao and St. Maarten have expressed their preference to 
obtain, separately, a Status Aparte similar to Aruba, while the other three islands would prefer a 
direct constitutional dependence with the Netherlands. The redefinition of their relations with the 
European Union is part of the considerations.
Ideally the five islands of the Netherlands Antilles need to be considered separately in 
any attempt to assess the implications of a CARIFORUM-EU EPAs on this OCTs, and the issues 
related to the Netherlands Antilles that should be considered in the EPA negotiations. Sint 
Maarten, as a tourist-oriented free zone, should be most interested in the parts of the agreement 
that deal with liberalization of trade in services, which is strongly linked to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations, and European support to improve tourism 
infrastructure in their neighboring islands45. It is evident, however, that strengthening tourism 
services in the surrounding islands would not necessarily affect in a negative way the economy 
of St. Maarten. The tourism “product” of these islands should be understood as one, based on a 
common “Caribbean” brand name. In fact, collaboration between the islands is already strong 
through the Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO) of which all independent Caribbean 
countries (except Dominican Republic), OCTs, outermost regions (except French Guyana), even 
Puerto Rico and United States Virgin Islands, as well as the islands of the Netherlands Antilles, 
separately, (except Saba), are members. If a Caribbean EPAs strengthens tourism infrastructure 
and services in CARIFORUM countries, its benefits would undoubtedly have positive spill-over 
effects on the entire region.
The situation is more complex for islands such as Curacao and Aruba. Aside from the 
tourism linkages, for which the argument, by and large, would follow the same line as indicated
tourism to elite marine-based tourism, together with off-shore business services and, in the case of Aruba and the Netherlands 
Antilles, oil-refinery and free-zone services.
44The country as it is today, a federation of five islands, autonomous within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, was created in 1986 
when Aruba left the federation and acquired its “Status Aparte” within the Kingdom. Of the five islands, Curacao and Bonaire are 
close to Venezuela and St. Maarten, St. Eustatius and Saba are hundreds of miles to the Northeast, in the vicinity of Anguilla and 
St. Kitts and Nevis. Their political union was never easy and the country’s economy never became fully one. Curacao shares with 
Aruba a common language, Papiamento, whereas in the North-eastern islands English is the language of choice. St. Maarten, in 
the north, is a free-trade zone while Curacao, in the South, maintains high import tariffs. A company that produces in St. Maarten 
and sells in Curacao will have to pay customs duties as well as high transport costs. Intra-island trade within the Netherlands 
Antilles is therefore only 2% of the federation’s external trade. Antilliaanse Economie, Economenblad, Vol. 27, June 2004
45 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements, 
especially the section Caribbean Region: Tourism, provides an encompassing overview of the possible impacts of a Caribbean 
EPA on the tourism sector.
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for Sint Maarten, both islands have an important oil-refinery industry and some local production 
of light manufacturing. Curacao is also a trade hub for distribution of products, mainly of Asian 
origin, and related services throughout the Caribbean region and the nearby countries in South 
America. The Caribbean EPA negotiations as well as the policy evolution regarding Outermost 
Regions and OCTs may alter the relative benefits of different special relationships with the 
European Union. In the trade sphere, products from Europe would be able to enter the 
CARIFORUM economies against reduced tariffs and trade in services would be further 
liberalized, but products and services from Aruba and Curacao would not benefit from this. The 
Caribbean market is critical for these countries, especially for the Curacao distribution hub.
Also for other OCTs, the implications of a Caribbean EPA and the OCT-related issues 
that should be addressed in the EPA negotiations cannot easily be generalized and have 
specificities in each one of the countries and territories considered.
The British Virgin Islands, an economy that thrives on off-shore business services and 
luxury tourism, has the specificity of its geographic vicinity with the United States Virgin Islands 
and Puerto Rico. The local currency is the United States dollar and imports originate mainly 
from the United States. The country’s merchandise exports are negligible. The country’s obvious 
interests in the Caribbean EPAs would refer to liberalization and strengthening of tourism 
services, together with eventual consequences for off-shore business services.
The Turks and Caicos Islands have recently reached an agreement with the United 
Kingdom about constitutional reform. Self-government will be strengthened while the United 
Kingdom’s essential interests are preserved. The economy has been growing strongly on the 
basis of demand for vacation homes by United States tourists. Its predominant economic 
orientation is toward the United States and the country’s involvement in regional affairs is 
limited. The country has few merchandise exports and imports come predominantly from the 
United States. Although the effects of a Caribbean EPAs on the economy would appear to be 
very limited, and the country has limited relations with CARIFORUM, the Government of Turks 
and Caicos Islands has expressed the wish to become involved in the EPA negotiations. 
Functional cooperation with Caribbean neighbors, especially in the areas of transport, tourism 
and environmental management should be of considerable interest.
In any case, in the words of the President of the Association of Overseas Countries and 
Territories,46 the overseas countries and territories are affected by their more indeterminate 
relationship with the EU and by greater economic and trading uncertainty. Cotonou defines a 
comprehensive trade and development cooperation relationship for ACP countries with the 
European Community and the policy toward Outermost Regions is becoming a full-fledged 
development strategy in the context of the cohesion programme, including an area of functional 
cooperation between the two groups of countries in certain regions. On the other hand, a 
comprehensive European approach toward OCTs is much less clear, complicated by disparities 
in circumstances and interests. In general, these countries should be adversely affected by the 
erosion of trade advantages, their “inability to connect into the world trade system”47 and their




vulnerabilities stemming from isolation, remoteness and size. They will have to make a strategic 
decision whether to strive for the status of outermost region, with its loss of political 
independence and its gains in preferences; or to strive for fuller independence including, 
possibly, the status of EPA beneficiary; or, maintain the in-between status of OCT and work out 
a special arrangement with the best possible trade and economic cooperation relations with the 
European Community, either individually or collectively. None of these options will be easy or 
swift. Caribbean integration would benefit from an analysis that encompasses all types of 
countries and regions, and all types of possible arrangements.
The possible degree of involvement of OCTs in the EPA process is still under discussion. 
The European Commission cannot conclude an EPAs with an OCT because they are not 
sovereign States. OCTs cannot participate, not even observe, EPAs negotiations because only the 
Commission negotiates on behalf of the Community and not even EU member States can 
observe the negotiations. The only possible ways of OCT involvement in the EPAs discussions 
would be through closer collaboration with either the United Kingdom or the Netherlands and, 
through them, with the Commission or, on the other hand, through closer collaboration with 
CARIFORUM. These options neatly define the strategic juncture where OCTs find themselves.
7. Trade trends between Europe and the CARICOM
7.1 Trade flows in goods between CARICOM and the European Union
CARICOM’s trade is mainly directed to the United States and Europe. Available data 
from 1991 to 2004 show that, at the aggregate level, both destinations represent on average a 
quarter of its total merchandise exports respectively. The data shows an increase in the share of 
CARICOM exports to the United States and a decline in its exports to the European Union. (see 
Table 6 below).
At the country level the share of exports destined to Europe varies considerably. It is 
lowest for the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago (8% and 9% on average for 1991-2004). It is 
highest for the OECS accounting for 32% of total exports for the same period. Dominica and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines have the highest percentage of their exports destined to the European 
Union (42%).
The breakdown of total CARICOM exports to the European Union by country share for 
2001-2004 indicate that, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica have the most significant 
shares (40%, 25% and 20%, respectively). Contrarily Belize, Barbados, and the OECS have the 
smallest shares (3%,2% and 1%).
At the product level, CARICOM’s export composition to Europe has not significantly 
varied over time. The available data shows that the set of products, which accounted for 86% of 
total exports to Europe represented 92% of the total in 2002. This is reflected in the low value of 
the structural change index which was computed on a rolling basis at 0.23 for the main export 
products of CARICOM to the European Union.
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In addition the composition is highly concentrated. At three digit level, three products 
account for half of CARICOM’s imports to the European Union (ores and concentrates, ships 
and boats, sugar and honey (19%, 18% and 11% of the total for 2002, respectively). Similarly, 
10 products account for 80% of CARICOM’s exports to Europe. Export concentration is 
captured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index which takes a value greater than 0.5 in most cases.
A greater level of disaggregation shows an even higher concentration of CARICOM 
exports to Europe. Data at the six digit level shows that seven products account for 80% of the 
exports of CARICOM to Europe. In a similar vein one product methanol/alcohol represents close 
to 50% of all CARICOM exports to the EU (see Table 8 below).
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T a b le  6
E x p o rts  to  th e  E u ro p ea n  U n io n  an d  N A F T A  as a p erc e n ta g e  o f  to ta l ex p o rts
T o ta l e x p o rts  to  th e European U n io n  as a p erc en ta g e  o f  to ta l ex p o rts
1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 4 A v er a g e
OECS 33.84 32.43 29.57 31.95
Antigua and Barbuda 23.31 23.31
Dominica 43.16 41.96 40.03 41.71
Grenada 22.94 27.28 25.57 25.26
St. Kitts and Nevis 28.20 19.03 7.35 18.19
Saint Lucia 34.33 38.95 33.31 35.53
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 40.60 44.06 41.59 42.08
LDCs 27.28 27.68 23.45 26.14
Belize 20.71 22.93 17.33 20.32
MDCs 19.31 16.39 16.03 16.63
Bahamas, The 7.28 9.12 8.20
Barbados 24.18 24.50 23.42 24.03
Guyana 18.99 19.81 19.40
Jamaica 17.36 17.57 18.17 17.70
Suriname 23.41 20.49 19.14 21.01
Trinidad and Tobago 12.28 9.54 6.54 9.45
CARICOM 26.72 24.30 21.78 23.55
T o ta l e x p o rts  to  N A F T A  as a p e r c e n ta g e  o ' to ta l ex p o rts
OECS 16.04 17.29 20.21 17.85
Antigua and Barbuda 26.31 26.31
Dominica 6.76 7.97 9.74 8.15
Grenada 27.03 22.70 24.10 24.61
St. Kitts and Nevis 21.70 30.22 42.52 31.48
Saint Lucia 15.46 10.77 16.28 14.17
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 9.22 5.78 8.40 7.80
LDCs 23.70 22.37 25.01 23.69
Belize 31.36 27.45 29.81 29.54
MDCs 26.16 31.04 30.65 30.37
Bahamas, The 42.56 40.75 41.66
Barbados 25.05 24.96 25.67 25.23
Guyana 30.42 29.80 30.11
Jamaica 29.07 29.27 28.06 28.80
Suriname 13.54 18.17 16.26 15.99
Trinidad and Tobago 37.00 40.86 43.37 40.41
CARICOM 21.62 24.42 26.23 24.94
Source: WITS (2005)
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T a b le  7
Im p o r ts  from  th e  E u ro p ea n  U n io n  an d  N A F T A  as a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  to ta l im p o rts
T o ta l im p o r ts  from  th e  E u ro p ea n  U n io n  as a p erc e n ta g e  o f  to ta l im ports
1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 4 A v er a g e
OECS 14.18 10.88 10.95 11.44
Antigua and Barbuda 7.49 7.49
Dominica 16.36 12.22 12.14 13.57
Grenada 13.42 10.71 10.53 11.55
St. Kitts and Nevis 8.54 6.74 6.88 7.39
Saint Lucia 14.88 13.08 12.12 13.36
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 17.72 15.04 13.06 15.27
LDCs 11.15 9.10 8.48 9.69
Belize 8.11 7.31 6.01 7.15
MDCs 13.41 10.47 11.61 11.17
Bahamas, The 1.81 1.17 1.49
Barbados 12.18 11.17 12.38 11.91
Guyana 15.44 10.64 10.97 12.35
Jamaica 7.02 7.00 7.86 7.29
Suriname 17.34 21.19 21.99 20.17
Trinidad and Tobago 15.07 11.00 15.27 13.78
CARICOM 12.28 9.78 10.04 10.43
T o ta l im p o r ts  to  N A F T A  as a p erc en ta g e  o ' to ta l im p o r ts
OECS 32.42 35.18 35.87 34.87
Antigua and Barbuda 37.57 37.57
Dominica 29.64 33.18 33.77 32.20
Grenada 32.96 35.18 35.92 34.69
St. Kitts and Nevis 38.03 40.27 41.12 39.81
Saint Lucia 31.16 33.02 34.83 33.00
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 30.31 31.87 33.72 31.97
LDCs 38.21 39.81 22.81 39.51
Belize 43.99 44.44 45.61 44.68
MDCs 32.91 36.05 34.64 35.37
Bahamas, The 47.69 48.07 47.88
Barbados 33.08 33.80 33.71 33.53
Guyana 31.29 35.43 34.23 33.65
Jamaica 39.44 38.99 38.24 38.89
Suriname 31.06 24.68 22.82 26.19
Trinidad and Tobago 29.67 35.73 30.77 32.06
CARICOM 35.56 37.93 28.72 37.44
Source: WITS (2005)
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The classification by economic category shows that CARICOM exports mainly consumer 
and intermediate goods (34% and 36% on average for 1995-2002) of the total and to a lesser 
extent raw materials and capital goods (16% and 12% for the same time period). The 
classification by economic aggregate indicates that agricultural materials and food are the main 
export products (60% of the total for 1995-2004 on average for the same time period) followed 
by ores and metals and manufactures (14% and 13%, respectively, for 1995-2004 on average).
T a b le  8
E x p o rt o f  C A R IC O M  to  th e  E u ro p ea n  U n io n  at th e  six  d ig it leve l
P ro d u c ts
Methyl alcohol /methanol/
S h a re  o f  C A R IC O M  
ex p o rts  to  th e  
E u ro p ea n  U n ion
46.64
A cc u m u la te d
S h are
46.64
Wire rod iron steel not high carbon 10.83 57.47
Sponge iron or steel 7.77 65.23
Ammonia,anhydrous or in aqueous sol 6.22 71.45
Nutmeg,mace & cardamons 3.82 75.27
Excavating, levelling, boring, etc. 2.37 77.64
Special purpose vessels(e.g. light v 1.79 79.43
Amine-function compounds 1.60 81.03
Other miscellaneous food preparation 1.47 82.51
Source: WITS (2005)
T a b le  9
N u m b e r  o f  c o m m o d itie s  ex p o r te d  an d  d iv er s if ica tio n  an d  c o n ce n tr a tio n  in d ices
S e lec ted  C a r ib b ea n  co u n tr ies
20 0 3
C o u n tr y N u m b e r  o f D iv er s if ic a tio n C o n c en tr a tio n
co m m o d itie s in d ex in d ex
ex p o rte d
Barbados 184 0.739. 0.45
Dominica 135 0.482 0.637
Jamaica 190 0.452 0.502
Saint Lucia 155 0.826 0.557
St. Kitts and Nevis 141 0.766 0.624
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 145 0.700 0.60
Trinidad and Tobago 205 0.470 0.203
Note: The diversification index refers to the absolute deviation of the country share from the world
structure. It is equal to: Di = E (Sij -  Si)/2, where Sij = share of commodity i in total exports of country j. Si= 
share of commodity i in total world exports. The diversification index takes higher values as the export 
structure is less diversified. The concentration index is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index. The index ranges
from 0 to 1. A value of 1 is an indication of maximum concentration. It is equal to: (^E(xi/X)2 -  Vi/n)/(1- 
Vi/n)
xi = value of exports of product i.
X = total exports. 
n = number of commodities.
Source: WITS (2005)
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At the country level in the majority of cases the main export products are primary 
products. In the cases of Barbados, Belize Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, and 
Saint Lucia, agricultural products are the main export products (29%, 39%, 74%, 76% and 88% 
of the total). For Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, mining products are the main 
export products (61%, 75% and 71% of the total, respectively). Antigua and Barbuda, The 
Bahamas and St. Vincent and the Grenadines constitute the exception as their most important 
export product is ships and boats (92%, 40% and 76% of the total).
By far the majority of the products exported by CARICOM to the EU enter duty free (see 
Table 8 below). Note that some of the main products exported (rice, sugar, fruits and nuts) fall 
under the provisions of the Lomé Protocols.
CARICOM imports from the EU are less significant than its exports. The EU imports 
represent 11% of the total for 1991-2004. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is the 
main supplier of CARICOM (37% of the total for the same period). The most dependent 
countries on European imports include Suriname, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Saint Lucia (20%, 15%, 14% and 13% of their total exports on average for 1991­
2004). (see Table 7)
The composition of imports differs in the degree of its value added content from that of 
exports. Exports include mainly commodities which are labour intensive and with low 
technological content. Contrarily imports comprise mostly products with medium technological 
content. More precisely, imports include mainly manufactures followed by machinery and 
transport equipment, agricultural materials and food products (33%, 11%, 8% and 8%, 
respectively, on average of the total for 1996-2003).
With the exception of manufacturing the major categories of imports are not the most 
protected products. Indeed the correlation coefficient between the main import categories as a 
percentage of the total and the corresponding weighted tariff rates is equal to 0.22. As visual 
inspection well of the scatter plot does not show a positive relations between both variables (see 
Figure 3 below). This follows form the fact that, contrary to other integration arrangements, 
CARICOM’s tariffication is inversely related to the value-added content of imported products. 
That is the most protected product are those with low value added, that is agricultural products.
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F ig u re  3
R e la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  a v e ra g e  w e ig h te d  ta r if fs  a n d  im p o rts  
1996-2003
A v erag e  w e ig h te d  ta r i f f  ra te
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Table 10
Im ports o f C A R IC O M  from  th e  E u ro p ean  U nion by aggregate 
S hare  o f  to ta l (averages)
1996-2003
P ro d u c t nam e
A ntigua
and
B a rb u d a




St. V incent and 





Agricultural Materials 9.83 5.44 6.14 14.47 9.84 8.59 7.85 4.86 8.89 10.10 8.91 4.10 8.25
Agricultural Raw Materials 0.10 0.28 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.54 0.72 1.30 0.14 0.31
Chemicals 2.01 5.66 8.05 3.60 6.12 2.45 5.01 5.24 2.33 2.61 3.22 3.55 4.15
Food 9.73 5.17 6.07 14.35 9.65 8.43 7.78 4.78 8.35 9.38 7.61 3.96 7.94
Fuels 0.22 0.05 6.06 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.31 1.32 0.06 0.08 0.02 2.45 0.89
Machinery & Transport Equipment 13.80 10.88 7.61 6.60 8.57 13.18 10.52 14.76 9.51 11.11 9.09 17.80 11.12
Manufactures 23.07 27.54 24.75 18.70 23.30 24.49 25.17 27.78 24.16 22.80 23.80 28.21 24.48
Miscellaneous Goods 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Ores & Metals 0.15 0.24 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.42 0.59 0.68 1.37 0.23 0.36
Other manufactures 7.26 11.00 9.09 8.50 8.61 8.86 9.64 7.78 12.33 9.08 11.49 6.87 9.21
Textiles 0.97 0.76 1.21 0.31 0.41 0.51 0.52 0.33 0.39 0.54 0.72 0.39 0.59




W eighted  ta r if f  ra tes  o f E uro p ean  im ports by aggregate 
2003
P ro d u c t nam e A ntigua
and
B arb u d a




St. V incent 
and  the 
G renadines
T rin idad  
and  Tobago
Agricultural Materials 15.78 34.06 13.26 16.61 14.34 53.3 16.93 19.29 11.36 15.71 10.26 14.43
Agricultural Raw Materials 4.91 9.04 27.69 6.54 4.75 22.87 7.64 1.73 0.35 1.7 6.91 1.38
Chemicals 10.75 13.41 14.61 8.71 5.84 38.85 8.61 6.1 7.45 10.52 7.96 6.43
Food 15.9 35.09 13.09 16.62 14.53 56 17.07 19.48 12.45 16.85 10.42 14.95
Fuels 7.31 5 34.26 28.53 5.38 24.27 10.77 5.75 9.82 1.3 7.7 13.6
Machinery & Transport Equipment 12.29 10.79 37.58 7.65 8.89 25.17 6.8 5.27 9.32 7.3 11.63 2.37
manufactures 11.7 12.2 24.55 8.06 10.49 29.75 7.53 5.89 8.96 8.67 10.64 3.39
Miscellaneous Goods 0 5 4.67
Ores & Metals 3.51 5.95 31.13 7.74 4.32 18.59 7.96 0.52 0.24 0.79 4.76 2.12
Other manufactures 10.59 13.36 21.43 8.03 16.74 30.85 7.84 7.32 8.9 10.3 10.46 4.6
Textiles 15.47 13.6 25.93 11.87 14.49 43.76 5.54 9.53 18.74 17.13 13.57 5.15
Total non-oil trade 12.87 15.52 21.69 11.16 11.66 35.44 9.51 7.71 9.4 10.47 10.52 4.49
Source: WITS (2005)
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CARICOM economies have registered in the aggregate for most years for which data is 
available (1991-2004) a trade deficit with the European Union. This follows from the fact that as 
implicitly stated above, CARICOM’s imports from the EU have an income elasticity of demand 
that exceeds that of its exports. The deficit averaged US$160 million and reached US$443 
million in 2003. Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and the OECS explain most of the accumulated 
deficit for the said period. Some of the most dependent economies on trade with Europe have 
exhibited for most years a positive trade balance with Europe. The trade imbalance represents - 
1% of GDP for CARICOM in the aggregate and -+2% of GDP for deficit and surplus countries 
alike. Belize and Barbados register the largest surplus and deficit respectively (3.6% and -4.2% 
of GDP) (see Figure 4 below).
Figure 4
Balance o f trade between CARICOM and the European Union (% o f GDP) 
1991-2003 
Averages
I Trinidad and Tobaqo~
Vincent and the G renadines"
St. Lucia~








Bahamas, The  
a nd Barbuda
-5.00 -4.00 -3.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
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T a b le  12
E x p o rt, im p o r t, m a rk et sh a re  an d  m a rk et a ccess  fo r  m a in  C A R IC O M  ex p o rt p ro d u c ts  to
W este rn  E u ro p e
P ro d u c t/C o u n tr y  
S h ip s an d  b o a ts
E x p o rt
sh are
M a r k e t sh a re Im p o r t sh a re
M a r k e t
a ccess
20 0 2 1985 2 0 0 2 1985 20 0 2
Antigua and Barbuda 91.7 0.247 2.200 0.508 0.379 NR
The Bahamas 39.6 0.284 2.242 0.508 0.379 NR
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 75.81 0.011 0.932 0.508 0.379 NR
F ru it  a n d  N u ts
Belize 39.14 0.074 0.17 0.905 0.688 NR
Dominica 32.6 0.364 0.074 0.905 0.688 NR
Jamaica 0.905 0.688 NR
St. Lucia 88.35 0.834 0.176 0.905 0.688 NR
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 19.83 0.346 0.134 0.905 0.688 NR
Suriname 0.233 0.069 0.905 0.688 NR
S p ices
Grenada 68.2 1.401 1.628 0.043 0.033 NR
C o co a
Grenada 6.6 0.139 0.037 0.347 0.137 NR
F resh  fish
Grenada 5.5 0 0.01 0.425 0.406 NR
Suriname 1.42 0.003 0.04 0.425 0.406 NR
S u g a r  a n d  H o n ey
Barbados 28.75 1.053 0.489 0.245 0.189 NR
Belize 35.22 0.955 0.556 0.245 0.189 NR
Guyana 49.89 3.434 2.157 0.245 0.189 NR
Jamaica 10.72 2.509 1.599 0.245 0.189 NR
St. Kitts and Nevis 76.1 0.293 0.233 0.245 0.189 NR
Trinidad and Tobago 6.19 0.946 0.566 0.245 0.189 NR
A lc o h o lic  b ev er a g es
The Bahamas 35.9 0.405 1.203 0.554 0.641 NR
Barbados 9.2 0.01 0.046 0.554 0.641 NR
F ru it p reser v ed  an d  fru it  
p rep a ra tio n s
Belize 6.06 0.005 0.061 0.329 0.296 NR
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R ice
Guyana 14.86 0.483 2.747 0.084 0.044 NR
Suriname 4.29 5.588 1.118 0.084 0.044 NR
O res a n d  co n ce n tr a te s
Suriname 75.76 2.465 3.392 0.571 0.257 NR
Jamaica 61.31 1.767 6.715 0.571 0.257 NR
E lec tr ica l m a ch in e ry
Dominica 14.5 0 0.017 1.511 1.376 NR
P ig  Iron
Dominica 8.7 0 0.088 0.24 0.154 NR
R o ta tin g  p la n ts
St. Kitts and Nevis 10.14 0 0.014 0.33 0.405 NR
Note: NR = no restrictions
Source: CAN (2004) and TARIC (2005)
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At the aggregate level, CARICOM has lost market share over time. This is clearly seen in 
Figure 4 below. CARICOM’s market share in Western Europe’s imports declined from 0.12% to
0.09% between 1985 and 2002. At the country level, Guyana, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and 
Tobago register the largest drops in market share. The European Union has also lost market share 
in the CARICOM import market. In 1985 and 2003, the European Union represented 19% and 
15% respectively of all CARICOM imports.
7.2 A competitive analysis of CARICOM exports to Western Europe
Figure:
CARICOM's share in the to ta l im ports o f  W estern Europe 
1985-2002
G \ G \ G \ G \ G \ G \ G \ O ' n O ' n O ' n O ' n O ' n O ' n O ' n O ' n O O O
Years
In order to gauge the competitiveness of CARICOM exports to CARICOM a 
competitiveness matrix was constructed. The computations were carried out using ECLAC’s 
CAN software programme. (see Table 13 below).48
48 The analysis combines the change of an exporter country’s product market share with the dynamism of product demand. 
Exporter countries can either gain or lose market shares in specific products. Products can have either stagnant or dynamic import 
demand. Rising Stars refer to a situation in which a country gains market share in a product with dynamic demand. Declining 
Stars indicate market share gains where demand is less dynamic or stagnant. Missed opportunities are situations where losses in 
market share occur together with dynamic demand. Finally, Retreats are those situation in which an exporter country loses market 
share in conditions of stagnant demand.,
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T a b le  13
C A R IC O M  ex p o rts  to  W este rn  E u ro p e  
M a r k e t sh a re  co m p etit iv e  m a tr ix , 1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 0 , 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 5  an d  19 9 5 -2 0 0 2  
at th e  th r e e  d ig it le v e l an d  e x p re sse d  as a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  th e  fin a l y e a r  ex p o rts






































T a b le  14
E u ro p ea n  U n io n  e x p o r ts  to  C A R IC O M  
M a r k e t sh a re  co m p etit iv e  m a tr ix , 1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 0 , 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 5  an d  19 9 5 -2 0 0 2  
at th e  th r e e  d ig it le v e l an d  e x p re sse d  as a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  th e  fin a l y e a r  ex p o rts






































In the first period (1985-1990) CARICOM benefited from favorable demand conditions 
mainly in stagnant markets. CARICOM registered market share gains for most exports (68% of 
the total). The majority of the market share gains (58%) occurred in stagnant markets and 42% of 
the total occurred in dynamic markets.
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In the second period (1990-1995) CARICOM increased its market share gains for the 
greater majority of its exports to Western Europe. Market share gains occurred mainly in 
dynamic markets (54% of the total).
In the third period (1995-2002) CARICOM member States witnessed deterioration in 
their competitive position in the European market. Although most of Caribbean exports (57.7%) 
were still able to register market share gains, the percentage is lower than in the previous periods. 
In addition, stagnant commodities explained a higher percentage of Caribbean exports than in 
any previous period.
Overall a comparison between CARICOM exports to the EU and those of the EU to 
CARICOM shows that, CARICOM has, over time, experienced market share losses and that 
these losses are concentrated in stagnant commodities. For its part, between 1985 and 2002 the 
European Union has gained market share in dynamic commodities (See Tables 13 and 14 above).
A more detailed analysis of the data at the products level reveals that the majority of 
CARICOM export products have lost market share in the EU. In addition CARICOM has lost 
market share in most of its main primary products, namely sugar and honey, rice and fruits and 
nuts, and cocoa. Finally, CARICOM has gained market share in mining and manufactured 
products (ores and concentrate, electrical machinery, ships and boats, among others).
7.3. Trade flows in services between CARICOM and the European Union
The services sector has traditionally been identified as the sector that will provide the 
impetus for growth in the future and thus should continue to contribute to output, growth, 
employment and the provision of basic needs. Services form a major portion of CARICOM 
economies and, in particular, of those of the OECS domestic economies. Services also represent 
the bulk of CARICOM and OECS foreign exchange earnings. In the case of the OECS, services 
represent between 65% and 90%% of total exports of goods and services.
The available empirical evidence shows that, as expected and reiterated, Mode 2 is the 
main form of CARICOM provision of services. For the OECS, Mode 1 has increased its share 
over the total provision of services over time and represented 20% of the total in 2001. As a 
result, the gap between both has narrowed over time. Contrarily the More Developed Countries 
(MDCs) have witnessed an opposite trend with Mode 2 increasing as a percentage of the total 
(i.e., Mode 1 falling as a percentage of the total). Overall for the last period for which data is 
available (1995-2000) Mode 1 and 2 represent on average roughly the same share of export 
services for both OECS and MDCs (See Tables 15 and 16 below).49
49 The state of existing data allows the classification of services exports only for GATS Modes 1 and 2. Mode 1, which is defined 
as ‘the supply of a service from the territory of one member into the territory of any other member’ is measured as the sum of the 
commercial services in the disaggregated balance of payments data minus travel. Mode 2, which is defined by GATS as ‘the 
supply of a service in the territory of a member to the service consumer of any other member,’ is measured as the sum of travel 
found in the balance of payment statistics. Mode 3 (defined as ‘the supply of a service by a service supplier of one member 
through commercial presence in the territory of any other member) is proxied by FATS accounts and Mode 4 (defined as ‘the 
supply of a service by a service supplier of a member, through presence of natural persons of a member in the territory of any 
other member) by the balance of payments line, compensation of employees. Data to provide estimates for Modes 3 and 4 is not 
available.
48
E x p o rts  o f  service  
In  p ercen ta g
T a b le  15  
;s D ec o m p o sit io n  b y  ca te g o ry  
e o f  th e  to ta l 1985  -2 0 0 2
1 9 8 0 ­
1985
1 9 8 5 ­
1990
1 9 9 0 ­
1995
1 9 9 5 ­
2 0 0 0
1 9 9 2 ­
1995
19 9 5 ­
20 0 2
O E C S
P e r c e n ta g e  co n tr ib u tio n  o f  se rv ic es  su b ca te gories to  th e  to ta l
Transport 0.44 9.40 10.94 9.31 8.57 8.67
Travel 88.91 79.20 77.12 73.83 74.6 66.6
Communications 1.64 1.27
Construction 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.09
Computer and information services 0.00 0.09
Insurance 1.01 1.20 2.01 1.93 2.03
Financial services 1.78 0.00 2.28
Royalties and license fees 0.12 0.00 0.02
Other business services 10.49 7.70 9.17 11.92 13.40 18.36
Personal, cultural and recreational 
services
Government services n.i.e. 1.71 1.02 1.44 0.21 1.18
M D C s
Transport 15.6 11.7 11.41 10.76 15.6 11.29
Travel 67.07 74.67 72.69 70.43 63.43 65.68
Communications 0.56 0.72 2.66 5.92 4.88 7.52
Construction 0.04 1.96 3.68
Computer and information services 0.39 1.18 1.18 2.21
Insurance 1.71 1.67 1.63 2.45 4.35 4.44
Financial services 0.22 1.45 5.13 4.86
Royalties and license fees 0.03 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.17
Other business services 10.54 7.21 7.93 5.25 1.60 2.48
Personal, cultural and recreational 
services 0.05 0.18 0.39 0.53
Government services n.i.e. 4.47 3.30 2.90 2.21 2.62 3.48
Source: On the basis of UNCTAD (2002) for the first four columns (1980-2000) and CARICOM (2005) for 
the last two columns (1992-2002).
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T a b le  16  
E x p o rts  o f  serv ices  
D ec o m p o sit io n  b y  M o d e  1 an d  M o d e  2 o f  se rv ic es  d e liv e ry
1985  -2 0 0 2
1 9 8 0 ­
1985
1 9 8 5 ­
1990
1 9 9 0 ­
1995
1 9 9 5 ­
2 0 0 0
O E C S
Mode 1 Value (US$ million) 22.67 104.50 888.70 306.83
Mode 2 Value (US$ million) 174.17 378.33 1,004.04 854.17
Mode 1 Share in total service exports 11.09 20.80 22.88 26.17
Mode 2 Share in total service exports 88.91 79.20 77.12 73.83
Mode 1 Share in GDP 4.09 7.75 10.18 12.12
Mode 2 Share in GDP 26.68 29.14 34.40 34.14
M D C s
Mode 1 Value (US$ million) 743.2 765.3 1,079.2 1,444.0
Mode 2 Value (US$ million) 1,524.8 2,268.0 2,838.3 3,447.0
Mode 1 Share in total service exports 32.96 25.33 27.31 29.57
Mode 2 Share in total service exports 67.04 74.62 72.69 70.43
Mode 1 Share in GDP
Mode 2 Share in GDP
Source: On the basis of UNCTAD (2002) for the first three columns (1980) and CARICOM (2005) for the 
last column.
The analysis of trade flows between the CARICOM and the EU is constrained by the 
limited extent of data availability. The available data indicates, in line with the analysis above 
and as it is well known, that travel and other services are the main export services to the 
European Union. The bigger economies of Europe such as France, Italy and the United Kingdom 
are the most important receivers of services. In general contrary to the goods case the services 
balance is positive for CARICOM economies.50
The available data also indicates that trade in health and education services between both 
economies are also of significant importance. As an example, Imani (2005) reports that 2% of 
work permits approved for nurses in Great Britain in 2001 were granted to Trinidad and Tobago 
nationals. More detailed data for teacher work permits shows that Jamaica, followed by Trinidad 
and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados are the main exporters of teachers to the United Kingdom 
(See Table 19 below).
50 See, Willem te Velde. (2005) Special and Differential Treatment in CARIFORUM-EC Services Negotiations. With reference 
to Barbados, St. Lucia and Suriname. ODI (May 2005).
50 
T a b le  17
C a rib b ea n  -15  se rv ic es  ex p o r t to  E u ro p ea n  co u n tr ies  (2 0 0 3 ), € m illio n
(to be inserted)
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T a b le  18
B a la n c e  o f  C a r ib b ea n  -1 5  se rv ic es  tr a d e  w ith  E u ro p ea n  co u n tr ies  (2 0 0 3 ), € m illio n
(to be inserted)
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T a b le  19
C A R IC O M  c o u n tr ie s ’ sh a re  o f  a p p r o v ed  w o r k  p erm its  fo r  te a c h e r s  in  th e
U n ited  K in g d o m  
2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 3
2001 20 0 2 20 0 3 T o ta l
Jamaica 7.5 7.3 9.4 8.0
Trinidad and Tobago 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8
Guyana 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3
Barbados 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2
St. Lucia 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: On the basis of Bennell P. (2004) Teacher Motivation and Incentives in Subsaharan Africa
and Asia. Report for DFID, July.
8. The potential impact of the Cotonou agreement
From the point of view of the EU and ACP States, EPAs are not considered trade 
agreements in the traditional sense. EPAs are a development tool. Their main objective is to 
“help ACP countries to deal with the challenges of globalization by developing stronger regional 
economies.”51 EPAs recognize that unless ACP countries can overcome the limits imposed by 
capacity constraints and underdeveloped economic and social infrastructure they will not be able 
to reap the benefits from greater market access. That is, trade provisions included in trade 
agreements must be complemented with supply-oriented policies to build the required domestic 
capacity. In this sense the intention of the EPAs is to offer the flexibility allowing development 
needs to be taken into account.
The EU as well as ACP States recognize the benefits to be gained from EPAs. At the 
same time, both negotiating parties are cognizant that EPAs may have negative effects on ACP 
economies. The studies undertaken by the EU Commission point out that the reciprocity and the 
erosion of trade preferences envisaged by the Cotonou agreement and the EPAs will have 
important economic and social impacts.52. These may affect trade flows and the balance of 
payments through losses in export revenues and increases in imports. The losses in export 
revenue will result from the erosion of trade preferences. The decrease in tariffs may also lead to 
increase in imports. The agreements may also affect the budget constraint through reduced 
revenues as a consequence of the narrowing of the tax base. Furthermore, the changes in the 
trade regime will most likely affect employment53 and economic growth.
51 EU Economic Partnership Agreements: putting a rogoutous priority on development. 20 January 2005. Memo.
52 The Sustainability Impact Assessment mentions the potential vulnerability of ACPs manufacturing sector. The EU also 
recognizes the importance of the fiscal impact of trade liberalization. See also Annex 5 for a summary of the potential effects of 
Cotonou on African States.
53 These effects are mentioned in the Impact Assessment. Annex to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and 
of the Council establishing accompanying measure for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime. 
Commission of the European Communities. Brussels.22.6.2005.
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At this stage of the negotiations, the estimation of the impact can only be a tentative 
exercise. This section presents results for two preliminary impact exercises. The first refers to the 
static impact using the standard methodology following a reduction in tariffs, that is trade 
creation versus trade diversion. The second exercise approaches the impact dynamically through 
a balance-of-payments growth model adapted to the Caribbean-European Union case.
8.1 Trade creation and trade diversion
The standard approach to analyzing the effects of a reduction in tariffs on trade is that of 
trade creation and trade diversion. In its origins the analysis of trade creation and trade diversion 
referred to the formation of a customs union. However the current trade literature uses both 
concepts to analyze the static welfare creation and diversion effects of the formation of a free 
trade area or to estimate the impact of tariff reductions.
Trade creation refers to a change in production of a good from a high-cost domestic 
source to a lower-cost source in a partner country. In this case given the fact that the product is 
not imported there is no loss in exports for any country. Trade diversion refers to a change in 
production from a lower-cost producer not belonging to the free trade area to a higher-cost 
producer belonging to the free trade area. This case assumes a discriminatory tariff reduction 
giving a member of a free trade area (FTA) a comparative cost advantage over a non-member by 
reducing its production costs. As a result the member increases its production efficiency over the 
non-member. A free trade area is said to be welfare improving if trade creation is greater than 
trade diversion. Note that a member of a free trade area can increase its welfare gain by 
individually reducing tariffs.
In his seminal contribution, Jacob Viner (1950) identified the conditions that if  met by 
the FTA could improve its efficiency. These included, the geographical extension of the FTA, 
the level of the external tariff adopted by the members following the formation of the FTA 
relative to the previous tariff level, the degree of complementarity, differences in unit costs, and 
the level of tariffs prevailing outside the FTA.
The greater the geographical extension, the greater are the opportunities for trade 
creation. A greater geographical extension means a greater extension of the market and thus a 
greater scope for trade specialization and the generation of economies of scale. Also a greater 
geographical area can also involve a greater stock of natural resources implying the possibility of 
a more diversified export base.54
Finally a greater geographical area can help to reduce transaction costs, when these are 
defined to include ‘transportation, communications, bureaucratic red tape and transshipping 
costs.’ The reduction in transaction costs increase profits and thus the incentives to export.
The relationship between the degree of complementarity and that of a trade diversion and 
trade creation of an FTA can be seen from different perspectives. A low degree of
54 Recent findings also indicate that at least in the case of the United States, population is a factor that can account for greater 
innovation. As put by Hernández-Murillo (March, 2003): ‘Recently economists have found that densely populated areas are 
increasingly providing the best environment to facilitate the diffusion of new ideas, in addition to serving as the location for the 
production of goods. The reason is that the agglomeration of people and firms in urban areas promotes a faster exchange of 
information and ideas and this generates new technologies.’
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complementarity in the production structures of States forming a FTA reduces the scope for trade 
diversion. Notwithstanding the formation of the FTA, member States will continue to trade with 
the rest of the world. In the same way a high degree of complementarity may enhance 
intraregional trade widening the possibilities for trade diversion.
Contrarily it may also be stated that countries with a low degree of complementarity are 
also more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, thus reducing the possibilities for trade.
Lower tariff levels in a FTA reduce the possibilities of using tariffs to promote 
intraregional trade at the expense of extraregional trade and thus implicitly the use of subsidies to 
maintain inefficient production. Available empirical evidence indicates that certain regional 
trading blocs such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) or even CARICOM use their 
common external tariff to protect determinate products (motor vehicles in the case of Mercosur 
and agricultural products in the case of CARICOM). In other cases (i.e., NAFTA) the evidence 
indicates that tariffs have not been used as a tool to promote intraregional trade.
Other factors to take into consideration in analyzing the issue of trade diversion and trade 
creation are the presence of imperfect markets and the variations in the terms of trade. Trade 
creation can be enhanced when an FTA member faces high tariffs from the rest of the world in 
products with decreasing costs or when, due to size considerations, the scale of production is too 
small to yield an optimum scale of production. The existence of economies of scales can lead to 
trade creation through a production, consumption and cost reduction effects. The production 
effect allows the transfer of production to the lower cost trade partner. The consumption effect 
refers to the gain in the consumer surplus due to a decline in price. The cost reduction effect 
denotes a change to cheaper sources of supply.
More recently, Dunn and Muti (2000) identified three effects that could increase the 
efficiency of a free trade area: (i) a shift in output, where price is greater than average cost; (ii) a 
scale effect, where firms’ average costs of production fall when output expands; (iii) increase in 
trade allows for the expansion of in the variety of final goods and intermediate inputs that are 
traded.
Finally, member States forming a free trade area and, more specifically, a customs union 
can impose a level tariff such as to provoke an increase in the terms of trade for the members of 
the union. In this case the welfare gains are at the expense of the rest of the world and this case 
does not consider the possibility of retaliation. An increase in the terms of trade via a rise in 
tariffs creates trade deviation and is thus not a welfare enhancing measure. There are, however, 
two points of view to this story.
The empirical studies analyzing the welfare effects of the formation of free trade areas 
find that the evidence is ambiguous. Panagariya (2000) distinguishes two approaches to this 
issue. The first is based on some type of general equilibrium models whereby starting from a 
base model with a given structure and parameters tariff barriers among trade partners are 
removed. The second type of approach is based on gravity equation estimates. Panagariya (Ibid. 
p.326) writes: ‘Consider first the simulation approach. It is relatively easy to manipulate the 
structure of the model, functional forms and parameter values in these models to obtain one’s
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desired results.’ Regarding gravity equation estimates the criticism focuses on the fact that the 
success of the FTA is based on aggregate trade creation or diversion when in fact the question is 
to identify whether trade creation and trade diversion have occurred at the sectoral levels which, 
in fact, demands significant information requirements, which are difficult to obtain. Finally, it is 
to be noted that the analytical exercise in trade creation-trade diversion does not contemplate two 
crucial aspects for trade negotiations, trade in services which for the smaller economies of the 
Caribbean is the main form of international trade and the relationship between foreign direct 
investment and free trade areas.
Empirically the question of trade creation and diversion is analyzed using the SMART 
Simulation technique. In SMART in the case of trade between the Caribbean and the EU, trade 
creation refers to “the increase in the Caribbean’s imports from the EU owing to a decline in the 
relative price of these imports vis-à-vis domestically produced goods.” Following this logic there 
is an increase in the Caribbean’s total imports and a decrease in the Caribbean’s domestic 
production.
Trade diversion refers “to the increase in Caribbean’s imports from the EU due to a 
decrease in the relative price of these imports vis-a-vis imports from other countries resulting in a 
different geographical composition of imports.” In this case, imports from the European Union 
increase at the expense of imports from other sources. There is no variation in total imports from 
the Caribbean.
8.2 Trade creation and trade diversion at the aggregate and sectoral levels
The SMART methodology (See Annex) was used to compute the effects of trade creation 
and trade diversion at the aggregate and sectoral level. The analysis was undertaken for 
Caribbean imports from Europe since Europe applies duty free to the majority of its imports 
from the Caribbean.
Trade creation here refers to the increase in Caribbean imports from the European Union 
as a result of the reduction in tariffs. Implicitly in the analysis is the understanding that the 
increase of European imports occurs at the expense of Caribbean producers. For its part trade 
deviation refers to the displacement of imports in the Caribbean market from third countries. 
More specifically the analysis contemplated the analysis of trade deviation from the other major 
partner of the Caribbean, the United States.
At the sectoral level the following categories were included in the analysis: (i) 
agricultural materials; (ii) agricultural raw materials; (iii) chemicals; (iv) food; (v) fuels; (vi) 
machinery and equipment; (v) manufactures; (vi) ores and metals; and (vii) textiles.
The data set used comprised the period 1996 to 2003. The trade data was supplied by the 
United Nations Conference on trade and Development (UNCTAD) from the TRAINS database. 
The tariffs used in the analysis were the weighted tariff rates.
The elasticity of import demand as well as the elasticity of substitution are key 
parameters in the exercise influencing the results to a significant extent. Following the literature
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on the subject (Stern et al.(1978); Cline et al. (1978) and Jachia and Teljeur (1999)) the SMART 
default value of -1.5 was used in both cases. In addition the scenario simulated the extreme case 
of full tariff reduction, that is, a full reciprocity scenario.
The results show that total trade creation resulting from the reciprocity scenario on the 
Caribbean market at the aggregate level amount to 5% of total current imports of the Caribbean 
from Europe.
Obviously by the logic of the SMART model the increase in trade creation would be 
lower if a smaller value of the elasticity of import demand and of the elasticity of substitution 
was used in the simulations.
In the same vein the countries that will register the most significant increases in trade 
creation, that is, of imports from Europe are those with the highest tariffs, namely Barbados, 
Bahamas, and Grenada. The sectors that will witness the greater increase in competition are 
those that are the most protected, namely light industry and primary sectors (agriculture and food 
sectors). These sectors in which the Caribbean already has an important installed capacity 
represent 16% of total Caribbean imports from Europe.
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Table 20
T rad e  crea tion  in  favour o f  th e  E u ro p ean  U nion in  te rm s o f  percentage o f to tal im ports o f  C A R IC O M
P ro d u c t m ane
A ntigua
and
B a rb u d a





St. V incent 






Agricultural Materials 14.0 32.5 10.9 14.9 12.3 47.3 15.3 18.0 8.6 13.9 7.2 12.4 18.0
Agricultural Raw Materials -0.1 5.6 26.7 2.2 -0.4 21.8 3.7 -4.8 -7.0 -4.9 2.7 -5.4 -0.8
Chemicals 7.8 11.1 12.6 5.1 1.2 36.6 5.0 1.6 3.4 7.5 4.1 2.0 4.8
Food 14.1 33.4 10.7 14.9 12.5 49.0 15.5 18.2 9.9 15.2 7.4 13.0 18.5
Fuels 3.2 0.0 32.7 27.5 0.5 23.3 7.8 1.1 6.6 -5.5 3.8 11.4 7.5
Machinery & Transport 
Equipment
9.7 7.8 35.5 3.7 5.4 24.2 2.5 0.4 5.9 3.2 8.9 -3.9 0.6
Manufactures 9.0 9.6 23.5 4.2 7.5 28.6 3.5 1.3 5.5 5.1 7.6 -2.3 2.5
Miscellaneous Goods -7.5 -0.5 -2.1
Ores & Metals -2.2 1.3 29.9 3.8 -1.0 17.2 4.1 -6.7 -7.1 -6.3 -0.3 -4.2 -3.4
Other manufactures 7.6 11.1 20.3 4.2 15.1 29.6 4.0 3.2 5.4 7.2 7.4 -0.6 4.9
Textiles 13.6 11.4 24.9 9.2 12.4 40.4 0.8 6.2 17.4 15.5 11.3 0.2 9.3
Total non-oil trade 10.5 13.7 20.6 8.3 8.9 33.7 6.2 3.8 6.0 7.4 7.5 -0.7 5.0
Total 10.4 13.7 20.3 8.2 8.9 32.4 6.0 3.5 6.0 7.3 7.5 -0.5 4.9
Source: On the basis o f WITS (2005)
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T able 21
T rad e  d iversion in  te rm s o f  percen tage o f  to ta l im ports
P ro d u c t nam e
A ntigua
and
B arb u d a





St. V incent 






Agricultural Materials 16.3 25.6 17.0 17.0 12.8 32.1 14.8 20.0 12.8 13.8 10.0 13.9 17.9
Agricultural Raw Materials 6.9 11.7 32.4 9.2 6.4 23.2 10.1 2.5 0.5 1.9 8.7 1.9 5.8
Chemicals 12.4 11.2 17.8 10.1 5.0 30.3 8.9 6.9 8.9 10.2 8.0 6.4 8.5
Food 15.9 25.3 16.7 16.8 12.4 32.1 14.6 19.8 13.6 14.5 9.8 13.8 17.7
Fuels 9.9 6.6 38.2 33.1 7.6 25.9 13.9 7.1 10.4 1.9 10.5 2.7 4.6
Machinery & Transport 
Equipment
12.2 9.7 39.9 9.9 9.6 18.3 6.8 5.4 10.8 6.7 12.0 2.2 5.4
Manufactures 12.6 11.1 28.6 10.1 10.5 23.0 7.6 6.5 10.2 8.5 11.1 3.2 6.9
Miscellaneous Goods 6.6 5.1
Ores & Metals 4.5 7.0 35.4 10.6 5.0 10.2 8.4 0.6 0.3 0.6 4.1 2.8 2.8
Other manufactures 12.5 12.5 25.7 10.1 16.5 26.0 7.8 8.6 9.9 10.7 11.1 4.4 9.0
Textiles 17.3 13.7 30.0 15.0 16.1 37.1 7.4 12.1 22.5 20.0 15.4 5.8 13.7
Total non-oil trade 13.7 13.6 25.9 13.2 11.3 25.8 9.3 8.4 10.7 10.0 10.7 4.2 8.6
Total 13.6 13.6 25.6 12.8 11.2 24.8 9.1 8.3 10.6 9.9 10.7 4.2 8.5
Source: WITS (2005)
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The results (see Tables 20 and 21 above) do not show very important effects on 
manufacturing and transport and equipment which account for roughly half of the imports of the 
Caribbean from Europe and which can have strong impact on productivity. Manufacturing and 
transport are two sectors for which, in general, the arguments for tariff liberalization outweigh 
those against it.
Thus overall the evidence show limited benefits for the trade creation potential as a result 
of tariff reduction. This conclusion is further compounded by the results of the trade diversion 
exercise.
The results for the trade diversion exercise show that trade diversion, which occurs at the 
expense of NAFTA countries, is greater than trade creation. Trade diversion represents close to 
9% of total current imports of the Caribbean and close to twice the figure for trade creation. 
Trade diversion is also greater for light industry and primary products (food and agricultural 
materials). At the country level trade diversion is most significant for the Bahamas and Grenada 
(26% and 25% of current imports). In the case of Grenada trade creation surpasses trade 
diversion while the opposite result holds for the Bahamas.
8.3 A dynamic analysis of the impact of the EPAs
The SMART simulation are static, that is they do not take into account investment 
creation or diversion, X-efficiency effects or growth effects which may actually be the most 
important consequences of the Cotonou and EPAs.
This subsection makes an attempt at measuring the dynamic effects. The dynamic effects 
are captured by analyzing the impact of the tariff reduction on the equilibrium rate of growth. 
The analysis is founded upon the fact that smaller economies are balance-of-payments 
constrained economies. Countries are balance-of-payments constrained in the sense that their 
performance in overseas markets, and the response of the world financial markets to this 
performance, constrains the rate of growth of the economy to a rate which is below that which 
internal conditions would warrant (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1999). As a result, the equilibrium 
rate of growth of an economy is that rate of growth, which maintains the equilibrium in the 
current account or in the basic balance of payments.
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According to the methodology here presented the equilibrium rate of growth of an 
economy is a function of a set of predetermined policy variables. These include, price and 
income elasticities, the rates of growth of the trading partners, the import and export shares and 
the changes in terms of trade and tariffs. 55
The long-term equilibrium growth rate of selected CARICOM economies was 
determined used using a balance-of-payments-constrained growth model (See Annex) with and 
without the terms of trade effect. The estimations were carried out in real terms. The estimation 
that took into account the terms of trade effect provided the benchmark to obtain rates of growth 
of output under two tariff reduction scenarios.
T a b le  22
R e su lts  o f  th e  s im u la tio n  fo r  th e  eq u ilib r iu m  ra tes  o f g row th
C o u n tr ie s
T erm s-o f-
tra d e
In co m e
e la stic ity
A ctu a l 
ra te  o f  
g ro w th
B P C




G ro w th
ra te
II
S cen a r io
I
S cen a r io
II
Barbados 2.09 2.92 1.14 1.91 1.08 0.87 0.91
Dominica 0.68 2.65 2.50 3.03 3.26 3.45 3.52
Grenada 0.84 1.19 3.68 4.34 5.20 4.92 5.01
Jamaica 2.31 0.81 1.59 2.91 4.85 3.45 3.51
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.18 1.72 4.58 4.44 4.45 4.41 4.50
Saint Lucia 0.66 1.22 3.79 4.42 4.93 4.92 5.01
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.01 1.95 4.47 2.81 2.83 2.83 2.88
Note:
The actual rate of growth refers to the average rate of real GDP growth
The BPC growth rate I refer to the rate of GDP growth which is consistent with the current account equilibrium. It does 
not consider the terms of trade effect.
The BPC growth rate II refers to the rate of GDP growth which is consistent with the current account equilibrium taking 
into account the terms of trade effect.
55 The price and income elasticities were obtained through econometric cointegration techniques. Cointegration provides an 
empirical analysis of long-run economic relations that take into account the potential non-stationary properties of the data. That 
is, it captures the fact that the time series processes may not have a constant mean or a bounded variance. The standard method to 
allow for non-stationarity in the estimation of long-run economic relations is to apply cointegration methods. The first step of this 
method requires verifying that the relevant variables have compatible orders of integration.The order of integration of a stochastic 
variable X(t) is defined as the number of times it must be first-differenced to obtain a stationary series. This task is here done 
through the application of the conventional and the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Once such compatibility is checked, the next 
step consists of estimating the number of stationary linear combinations (so-called cointegration vectors) of the relevant 
variables. If no such combination is identified the variables are said to be not cointegrated; in other words there is no stable long- 
run linear relation between them. On the other hand, if at least one such combination exists, the variables are said to be 
cointegrated and the estimated coefficients are interpreted as the long-run linear multipliers of the relevant regressors. To 
estimate the number, if any, of such cointegrating vectors we applied Johansen’s methods. They require to first specify a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) system with the set of relevant variables and then to estimate the number of long-run equilibrium 
relationships between them. The rest of the variables were obtained from available empirical evidence. Simple introductions to 
unit-root testing and cointegration analysis may be found in Cuthbertson (1992) and Charemza and Deadman (1992) and Enders 
(1995).
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The first scenario hypothesized a significant tariff reduction of 20% applied to Caribbean 
imports from Europe. The second scenario maintained the 20% tariff cut and added an increase 
in the rate of growth of real export of 2%. While the first scenario focuses purely on changes in 
trade regime, the second scenario also takes into account the possibility of an increase in the 
competitiveness of Caribbean exports to Europe, that is, it also takes into account the 
development-related aspect of EPAs.
The computations took into account the market share of Europe and the percentage of 
trade that pays import duties. The results are presented in Table 21 above. Several points are 
worth mentioning.
First, with the exceptions of Barbados and Jamaica, in all the cases considered the income 
elasticity tended to be greater and outweigh the terms of trade coefficient. This means that for the 
most part income effects predominate over price or substitution effects. The result implies that if 
price effects are not very important tariff changes may not have a significant effect on the 
demand for imports or on growth. The main driver of imports is income.
In addition this finding is also important to ascertain the fiscal effects of trade 
liberalization. If imports are not sensitive to price variations, the import tax base will not be 
affected by price changes. The tax base will respond to changes in income while the tax rate will 
respond more to tax policy considerations. Tariff reductions will translate into a decline in 
government revenue depending on if the rate of growth of the economy does not change or if  it 
decreases. The evidence thus far shows that the importance of international trade taxes have 
declined as a result of the decline in imports and in spite of the increase in the effective tax rates 
(See Tables 22 and 23 above).
Second, as shown in Table 21, the actual rate of growth is generally below the rate of 
growth, which is consistent with balance of-payments equilibrium. In other words, CARICOM 
countries have expanded at rates of growth below those dictated by the foreign exchange 
constraint. That is Caribbean countries have space to expand, demand and grow without 
endangering their external position.
Third, the first scenario which hypothesizes only a tariff reduction has a negative effect 
for all of the economies considered with the exception of Dominica and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. The magnitude of the negative effect is different. The consequent reduction in the 
equilibrium rate of growth is highest for Grenada and Jamaica (-0.28% and 1.4% percentage 
points of GDP). It is smallest for St. Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia (-0.04% and -0.01% 
percentage points of GDP).
Fourth, the second scenario which, combines the tariff reduction with an increase of 2% 
in real export growth results in an increase in the equilibrium rate of growth for all economies 
with respect to the first scenario. As a result, the growth in exports offsets, as would be expected, 
the tariff reduction.
Furthermore with respect to the rate of growth obtained using the balance-of-payments 
model with the terms of trade effect, the results show that in the case of Barbados, Grenada and
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Jamaica the overall effect is to reduce the equilibrium rate of growth (-0.17%, -0.19% and -  
1.34% percentage points of GDP growth, respectively). In Barbados and Jamaica this is due to 
the size of the terms of trade coefficient. Contrarily, in the cases of Dominica, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the overall effect is an increase in the 
equilibrium rate of growth (0.26%, 0.05%, 0.08% and 0.06% percentage points of GDP growth, 
respectively). For these economies the rise in export growth more than offset the effect of the 
decline in tariffs which, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, was significant not for most of 
these economies.
The results provided by the dynamic simulations point to the fact that the impact of the 
tariff reductions contemplated by a free trade agreement may not be very significant. The static 
results of the SMART methodology also point in that direction. In addition, the results indicate 
that a slight increase in exports brought about by an improved competitiveness as envisaged by 
the EPAs is more than sufficient in most cases to offset the effects on the rate of growth brought 
about by a reduction in tariffs.
Sectoral and country studies undertaken to show the economic and social impact of the 
EPAs and of changes in the existing trade regime between ACP countries and Europe also 
indicate that the overall negative effects may not be for the most part significant and that there 
will be positive effects that have to be taken into consideration. he results of three studies are 
presented. The first deals with the impact of the proposals of the European Commission to 
reform the sugar regime on ACP countries.56. The second focuses on the impact of EPAs on the 
economy of Trinidad and Tobago.57 The third centers on the effects of EPAs on the tourism 
sector in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
The first study referred to above presents two alternative scenarios for the reform of the 
sugar trading regime, the July 2004 and June 2005 proposals. In addition the study considers the 
possibility that ACP countries are granted unlimited access to the EU market from 2008 and 
alternatively that the current system of quotas is maintained after the year 2008. All estimates are 
based on the current cost structure.
Regardless of the proposal adopted, following the reform, the production of sugar will 
not be profitable for St. Kitts and Nevis (which has ceased production), Barbados, Belize, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The consequent impact will be important for Belize since 
sugar contributes 10% to its GDP (See table 1 above). It may also have an important effect on 
employment since for Belize, the sugar sector employs close to 13% of the labour force. 
However, in the rest of the economies the impact will not be as significant. Sugar is not a main 
contributor to the generation of output, employment or foreign exchange earnings.
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, it is expected that the implementation of the EPAs 
will have an effect on the manufacturing sector. However, the effect is projected to be small. It 
includes a 1% loss in employment in the manufacturing sector and less than 0.7% loss in 
government revenue.
567 LMC International (June 2005)
57 Imani Deevlopment (May 2005)
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The third study assesses the potential economic, social and environmental impacts of an 
EPA on the tourism sector in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The study undertaken under the 
Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-ACP EPAs simulates a scenario based on the full 
implementation of the CSME, and the full liberalization of all tourism subsectors under modes
1,2 and 3 and complete as possible under mode 4. The simulation of the impact is carried out 
under the important assumption that the EPAs will increase foreign savings and translate into an 
increase in physical capital. As a result GDP growth increases by 0.75% in the case of Jamaica 
and by 0.42% in the case of Trinidad and Tobago. Greater growth translates into higher levels of 
government revenue. In addition, greater tourism receipts have a positive effect on the external 
accounts and on employment.58
9. Conclusion
The Cotonou Agreement overhauls the relationship between ACP countries and Europe. 
Its scope is very broad and its main objective, the eradication of poverty consistent with the 
objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP countries into the 
world economy, is ambitious. One of the most important changes brought about by the Cotonou 
Agreement is that in consonance with WTO principles it replaces non-reciprocity by ‘reciprocity 
within flexibility’ as the basis for trading arrangements.
In order to ensure the smooth and gradual integration of ACP States into the world 
economy, the Cotonou agreement conceives economic and trade cooperation as based on a 
strengthened and strategic partnership between both negotiating parties. The agreement 
recognizes that the new trading arrangements should be introduced gradually and that a 
preparatory period of adaptation is needed. During the preparatory period, non-reciprocal trade 
preferences will be maintained. In addition during the preparatory period EPAs will be 
negotiated. Their main aim is to establish a timetable for the removal of trade barriers between 
the negotiation parties. The Cotonou agreement states that the negotiations shall take into 
account the level of development and the socio-economic impact of trade measures on ACP 
countries as well as their capacity to adapt and adjust to the liberalization process.
The EPAs are trade agreements that go beyond the conventional sense and even second- 
generation trade agreements. EPAs seek to promote economic development by addressing not 
only trade issues but also the limits imposed on ACP countries by capacity constraints and 
underdeveloped economic and social infrastructure. The EPAs are negotiated on a regional basis 
so that regional integration and world integration are part of the same process.
The EPA negotiations between CARIFORUM and the EU are scheduled in four different 
phases. Two of the phases have been completed and the negotiating parties are ready to embark 
on the third phase, which will probably start in a definitive form following the Hong Kong WTO 
ministerial meeting, which will take place in the first half of December 2005.
58 See Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements. See also, Savard, L. (2005) 
Impact Analysis on Tourism Sector: The Jamaican and Trinidad and Tobago Case Studies. A Computable General Equilibrium 
Analysis.
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The timetables for trade liberalization and the scope of trade liberalization have not yet 
been negotiated. As a result the measurement of the effects of EPAs can only be a tentative and 
very preliminary exercise. ACP countries have, however, expressed concerns about the effects of 
trade liberalization. The validity of these concerns has been recognized by the EU and by some 
of the impact studies that have been undertaken.
These include the loss of export earnings due to the erosion of trade preferences, the 
potential increase in imports due to the decline in tariffs, the vulnerability of some sectors to 
increased competition including not only the agricultural but also the manufacturing sector. In 
addition the potential costs of job losses and the social dislocation have also been pointed out as 
potential negative effects of EPAs.
At the same time EPAs are expected to induce greater flows of foreign savings. If 
properly channeled a greater level of foreign savings may result in expanding productive 
capacity leading to a higher level of economic growth. A greater level of foreign savings would 
soften the external constraint and growth would allow the expansion of government revenue.
The trade analysis presented in the paper shows that CARICOM exports to the EU 
represent roughly a quarter of its total exports. At the aggregate level CARICOM economies 
have lost market share in the EU. The analysis also shows that the loss in market share affects 
mainly primary and agricultural commodities and that in fact CARICOM has gained market 
share in products that have a higher degree of value added and technological content.
The dynamic simulations presented in this document show that the effect of tariff 
reductions on output growth will not be very significant. They also show that countries have 
space to improve their growth performance without endangering their external position. This has 
also important implications for fiscal policy because that tariff reduction may not have an 
important negative effect on government revenue.
From the point of view of this document, EPAs will have three important effects on 
CARICOM economies.
First, they will provide an incentive for CARICOM to accelerate and perfect its regional 
integration process. Regional integration is seen as a pre-condition for extraregional integration. 
The region can be a training ground for firms to become competitive at the extraregional level. 
The empirical evidence shows there is no absolute divide between the firms that export 
intraregionally from those that export extraregionally. That is, according to the results there is 
scope for expanding trade through Learning-by-Doing processes where the Learning-by-Doing 
would occur at the intraregional level allowing firms to acquire the skills and competitiveness to 
export to extraregional trade partners.
The challenge is to ensure that the process of regional integration adapts to the reality it is 
trying to change and addresses the needs of the signatory member States. One key issue that 
needs to be addressed in this regard is how to transform the impending polarization at the 
country and firm level into a growth pole for the region.
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Second, the EPAs will accentuate the economic tendencies that are entrenched in 
CARICOM. These include the stagnation of agriculture, the virtual disappearance of the 
manufacturing sector in some of the smaller States and the continued dynamism of the services 
sector. EPAs should ensure that its provisions do not lead to a process of economic duality, 
marginalisation of the traditional sectors of the economy, and annihilation of the manufacturing 
sector. Key to avoid this outcome is to ensure the crowding in of foreign and domestic 
investment. As it currently stands foreign direct investment has not been able to translate into 
greater domestic investment. In other words foreign savings have not resulted in greater levels of 
investment.
Third, the EPAs will also provide an opportunity for CARICOM countries to restructure 
or to continue to restructure their economies to adapt to a changing environment. Firms in the 
Caribbean have begun a process of restructuring of production aimed at reducing costs. Firms 
expect to achieve a reduction in costs via; (i) the expansion of their installed capacity; (ii) a 
change in the methods of production; (iii) diversification in their product lines.
Both the expansion of capacity and the diversification in the lines of production is under 
consideration by firms that are capital intensive. The change in method of production 
corresponds to a strategy adopted by smaller firms that, by definition, are more flexible and for 
which it is not as costly, as for firms that are capital intensive, to implement such a change.
Restructuring involves what is termed a crucial decision. Economic agents engage in 
crucial decisions when they cannot exclude from their mind the possibility that the very act of 
performing the experiment may destroy forever the circumstances in which the decision was 
made. In other words, crucial decisions are an act of creative destruction. They destroy the 
environment in which the decision was made so that the same process cannot be repeated. This is 
the underlying reason that justifies the pressing need to ensure that restructuring accomplishes its 
objective.
ANNEXES 
Annex I: Boxes 3 to 6 and tables 22 to 23
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B o x  3
E v o lu tio n  o f  th e  co o p er a tio n  b e tw e en  th e  E u ro p ea n  U n io n  an d  A C P  S ta tes
1957 Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West 
Germany sign the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The treaty includes a legal provision for a specific 
European cooperation programme
1963 African States gain independence, EEC develops first generation 
economic cooperation arrangements, mainly with French-speaking 
African countries (Yaounde conventions)
1973 The UK joins the EEC, bringing along its former colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific
1975 Lome I Convention (1975-80), the first major aid and trade cooperation 
arrangement between Europe and the ACP
1980 Lome II Convention (1980- 85)
1985 Lome III Convention (1985 -1990 includes for the first time a human 
rights clause
1990 Lome IV Convention (1990 -1995)
1990-1995 Lome IV bis Convention (1995 -2000) reinforces political cooperation 
and introduces possibility for suspending aid in cases of grave violation 
of agreed values and principles
1996 EC starts informal consultations on the future of ACP-EC cooperation 
(green paper)
1998 -2000 Negotiations for a successor arrangement to Lome
June 2000 Cotonou Agreement signed in Cotonou, Benin
April 2003 The Cotonou Agreement enters into force
Source: The Cotonou Agreement: User Guide For Non-State Actors 
ECDPM Publication -February 2004
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B o x  4
E sse n tia l tr a its  o f  th e  C o to n o u  A g re em en t
What The Cotonou Agreement is a Preferential Trade agreement between the EU on 
the one hand, and the 76 ACP States on the other. The agreement contains 
provisions on economic and trade cooperation, financial facilities, and political 
cooperation.
Why To promote economic growth and development.
The EU hopes that increased trade with the ACP States will foster integration 
into the world economic system, as well as promote competitiveness, 
efficiency, and increased investment in resources.
When The agreement was preceded by the Lome Conventions which began in 1975 
and were to last for a period of 25 years. Negotiations for the successor 
arrangement to Lome took place between 1998 and 2000, and the Cotonou 
Agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, in June 2000.
The Cotonou agreement came into force in April 2003, following a three-year 
transition period due to ratification deadlines. It will last until 2020.
Benefits to ACP states Large EU market size; goods are exempt from tariffs faced by non-ACP 
exporters
Benefits to EU Producers have a reliable and cheap supply of primary products (e.g. sugar). 
EU consumers are able to buy cheap goods.
O rg a n isa tio n :
The Actors Article 4 emphasizes that the ACP States have the sovereignty to determine the 
development principles, strategies and models of their economies and 
societies.
The agreement also recognizes the important contribution of non-State actors 
in the development process. It provides that non-State actors will be informed 
and involved in policy and strategy consultations; involved in implementation; 
be supported with financial resources to support local development initiatives; 
and be provided with capacity-building support to reinforce their capabilities.
Representative Bodies The EU is represented by the European Commission. The ACP States are 
represented by the ACP Secretariat. The ACP Secretariat is a legal body 
located in Brussels; it was signed into force at the Georgetown Agreement, in 
Georgetown, Guyana in 1975.
The joint institutions of the Cotonou Agreement are the Council of Ministers, 
the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly.
J o in t In stitu tio n s
Council of Ministers The Council of Ministers is composed of the members of the Council of the 
European Union and members of the Commission of the European 
Communities, and a member of the government of each ACP State. The 
Council generally meets once per year.
The role of the Council is to conduct political dialogue; to adopt policy 
guidelines for the implementation of the Agreement; to resolve obstacles to its 





Composed of the permanent representative of each Member State to the 
European Union and a representative of the Commission, and the head of 
mission of each ACP State to the European Union.
Its role is to assist the Council of Ministers in its tasks and to carry out any 
mandate entrusted to it by the Council; to monitor implementation of the 
agreement and progress in achieving its goals. The Committee meets regularly; 
to prepare the Council sessions and whenever else necessary.
Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly
Composed of equal numbers of EU and ACP representatives. The members of 
the Joint Parliamentary Assembly are members of the European Parliament 
and members of parliament of each ACP State (or representatives thereof). The 
Assembly meets twice a year in plenary session.
The Assembly is intended to be a consultative body. Its role is to promote 
democratic processes through dialogue and consultation; to facilitate greater 
understanding between the peoples of the EU and the ACP States and raise 
public awareness of development issues; to discuss issues pertaining to 
development and the ACP-EU Partnership; and to adopt resolutions and make 
recommendations to the Council of Ministers.
The Agreement dictates that the Assembly will organize regular contacts with 
representatives of the ACP-EU economic and social partners and other actors 
of civil society, in order to obtain their views on the attainment of the 
objectives of the Agreement.
E c o n o m ic  an d  T ra d e  
P r o v is io n s :
Trade Under the Lome Conventions, ACP countries were allowed free-trade access 
to EU markets. Goods from ACP countries were exempt from tariffs that other 
non-ACP exports face in bringing goods into the EU.
In Article 36, both parties agree to progressively reduce barriers to trade 
between them, to comply with WTO rules.
EPAs will replace existing trade relations when they are implemented in 
January 2008.
EPAs Article 37 provides that Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will be 
negotiated during the preparatory period (2002 -  2007). EPAs would establish 
reciprocal free trade areas that are compliant with WTO rules. Formal 
negotiations began in September 2002 and will end by 31 December 2007 at 
the latest. The EPAs will come into force on 1 January 2008, unless earlier 
dates are agreed upon by both parties.
If a non-LDC decides not to enter into a reciprocal EPA, the agreement states 
that there will be an examination of all alternative possibilities, to provide a 
new framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation and is 
in conformity with WTO rules.
Trade in Services The European Community pledges in Article 41 to give special consideration 
to ACP interests.
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The Joint Ministerial 
Trade Committee
Article 38 dictates that a Joint ACP-EC Ministerial Trade Committee will be 
established. It will be comprised of representatives of both parties, and will 
meet at least once per year.
The Committee will pay attention to current multilateral trade negotiations, 
and assess the impact of liberalization on EU-ACP trade and on ACP 
economic development. The Committee will make recommendations for 
amendments to the agreement, to preserve the benefits of EU-ACP trade.
Economic
Development
The Agreement emphasizes that the development strategies are to be locally 
owned by each ACP State, and will incorporate an integrated approach 
focusing on economic, social, cultural, environmental and institutional 
elements.
Article 20 dictates that EU-ACP cooperation strategies will focus on achieving 
economic growth, development of the private sector, strengthening of domestic 
institutions for efficient and competitive market economies, regional 
cooperation, environmental sustainability, and preservation of the natural 
resource base.




The European Development Fund (EFD) is the financial resource through 
which the EU pays for cooperation activities organized under EU-ACP 
cooperation programs. The ninth EDF pertained specifically to the Cotonou 
Agreement; 15.2 billion euro was made available, of which 74.3% was in the 
form of grants, and 25.7% in the form of loans.
Eligibility for 
Financing
ACP States, regional bodies and joint bodies are eligible for financial support 
provided by the Agreement.
Subject to the agreement of ACP States concerned, the following may also be 
eligible for financial support: national or regional public or semi-public 
agencies, departments or local authorities of ACP States, ACP financial 
institutions and development banks, private organizations in ACP States, and 
enterprises in EU States.
The Scope of 
Financing
Financing is intended to support debt reduction, macroeconomic and structural 
reforms; sectoral reforms; institutional development and capacity building; 
technical cooperation; and humanitarian and emergency assistance. Financing 
also includes funding for projects; credit lines, guarantee schemes and equity 





Article 83 establishes the ACP-EC Development Finance Cooperation 
Committee as a group within the Council of Ministers. At least once a year, 
The Committee is supposed to examine whether the objectives of development 
finance are being attained.
P o lit ic a l D im en sio n Articles 96 and 8 make provisions for political dialogue, specifically in the 
areas of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. If either party 
deems that the other is not fulfilling its commitment to human rights, 
democracy or the rule of law, that party can supply information to the Council 
of Ministers, in hopes of finding an acceptable solution to both parties. If the 
parties cannot come to a mutual agreement, or if the violating party is 
unwilling to negotiate, appropriate measures can be taken in accordance with 
international law.
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Article 11 addresses peace-building strategies and conflict resolution. It aims 
to prevent conflicts by addressing their root causes in a targeted manner. The 
article supports equality of opportunity, democratic legitimacy, good 
governance, and building civil society. Relevant issues include careful 
management of scarce natural resources, demobilization of combatants and 
reintegration into society, child soldiers, landmines, spread of weapons, and 
setting suitable limits to military expenditure and the arms trade. Financial 
resources will be provided in situations of violent conflict.
Effects of EU policies 
on the Cotonou 
Agreement
Article 12 dictates that if the Community intends to change a policy which 
affects the interests of ACP States, the ACP Secretariat will be notified ‘in 
good time’ of the impending change. The ACP States may also place a request 
for information. The ACP States can then consult, and offer suggestions for 
amendment. The European Commission is not obligated to compromise, and 
the final decision rests with the European Commission and not the Council of 
Ministers.
Education In Article 13 the parties pledge to develop cooperation programs to facilitate 
the access of students from ACP States to education, in particular through the 
use of new communication technologies.
R efo rm
Revision Clause Article 95 is a revision clause allowing adaptations to be made every five 
years. The first revision was signed in June 2005. Provisions on economic 
cooperation and trade are subject to a separate procedure.
If any party wishes to make an amendment to the agreement, they must notify 
the other party at least 12 months before the expiry of each five-year period of 
review. The other party then has two months to analyze the proposed 
amendments; negotiations between the two parties will begin 10 months before 
the review period is due to expire.
Accession Article 94 is a provision allowing for independent states to join the agreement. 
A request for accession may be made by an independent state whose 
‘structural characteristics and economic and social situation are comparable to 
those of ACP States’. Accession depends on the approval of the Council of 
Ministers. The State concerned shall enjoy the same rights and be subject to 
the same obligations as the ACP States.
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B o x  5
____________________________________________T h e B a n a n a  C ase____________________________________________
In 1997, Ecuador Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and United States challenged the European 
Community regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas established in 1993. This 
regime consisted of the establishment of a tariff quota of 2 million tons allocated to Latin American 
countries and non-traditional ACP bananas. The tariff quota increased to 2.1 and 2.2 million in 1994 
and 1995 respectively. Also an additional tariff quota of 353,000 tons was introduced in the same year. 
The increase in the tariff quota was justified on the grounds of the enlargement of the European 
Community. The quantities allocated to traditional ACP banana exporters totalled 857, 700 tons. The 
tariff applied to Latin American producers within the quota was 75 ECUs per tone and a zero duty for 
ACP countries. This regime was found to be illegal by the WTO dispute settlement body. In 1999, the 
European Union implemented a new regime that was still found to be WTO incompatible. The United 
States and Ecuador were granted the right by the dispute settlement body to suspend tariff concessions 
to the European Union. A solution was finally reached in 2001. The Agreement consisted of the 
adoption of a tariff-only regime by the European Union to be implemented no later than January 1, 
2006. In the interim, the regime to be applied consists of a two-phased scheme. The first phase 
consists in a modified import regime based on the historical allocation of licenses and entered into 
force in July 2001. It consists of three tariff rate quotas, A, B, and C. Quota A, is set at 2, 200, 000 
tons. Quota B is set at 353, 000 tons. Quotas A and B are open for imports originating in all third 
countries. Quota C (850, 000 tons) is open to imports originating in ACP countries. In the second 
phase, which starts in January 2002, 100, 000 tons are to be transferred from C quota to the B quota. 
The remaining 750, 000 tons will be still reserved for ACP bananas. At the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, WTO waivers were granted regarding obligations under Article I (permitting 
continued tariff preferences for ACP imports) and Article XIII of the GATT (permitting the setting 
aside of the C quota for ACP bananas).
Source: European Community (2000). European Community Council Regulations No.2587/2001 (19 December, 
2001); No.896/2001 (May, 2001). WTO. WT/MIN(01)/15 and WT/MIN/(01)/15 (14 November, 2001).
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B o x  6
C o m p a riso n  o f  th e  q u o ta /ta r if f  s tru c tu r e  u n d er  th e  p rev io u s  an d  cu rren t
B a n a n a  Im p o r t R eg im e
Q u o ta  (T on s) R em a rk s T a r if f  ra te R em a rk s
1993  b a n a n a  im p o r t reg im e
Latin American and 
non-traditional ACP 
bananas
2, 000, 000 Increased to 2.1 










quota of 353 000 
tones.
75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 






857,700 75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 




M o d ific a tio n  o f  th e  1993  im p o r t re g im e  in  2001
Quota A. Quota A is 
open for imports of 
products originating 
in all third countries






three tiered quota 
system (Quotas 
A, B and C)
75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 




Quota B is open for 
imports of products 
originating in all third 
countries
453, 000 75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 




Quota C is open for 
imports of products 
originating in ACP 
countries.
750, 000 0 for ACP 
countries
Sources: Official Journal of the European Communities. Council Regulations (EC), No. 2587/2001 (December, 
19, 2001); No. 896/2001 (May, 7, 2001); No.216/2001 (January, 19, 2001)
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Table 22
Im port tax classification and presentation by country  
1980-2004
Country Presentation format
Import tax dependency 
Percentage of total tax revenue
1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000a/ 2000-2004
International trade and transactions 58.3 59.1 57.7 55.0
Import duties 28.2 25.4
Consumption tax 17.9 15.4
Customs service charge 7.2 8.5
OECS Foreign currency levy 0.7 0.6
International trade and transactions 63.8 65.8 66.5 61.7
Import duties 19.5 16.5
Consumption tax 28.7 23.7
Customs service charge 9.0 12.6
Antigua and Barbuda Foreign currency levy 2.8 2.4
Bahamas
International trade and transactions 
Import tax 
Stamp tax from imports 
Export tax 
















Barbados Import duties 9.34 8.80 9.51
Belize International trade and transactions 58.3 41.1 43.3
International trade and transactions 62.8 57.0 53.7 51.4
Import duties 14.0 12.6
Foreign exchange tax 0.0 0.0
Consumption tax 32.6 29.2
Dominica Customs service charge 2.4 4.2
International trade and transactions 54.0 60.2 61.1 60.2
Import duties 13.7 13.4
Foreign exchange tax 0.1 0.1
Consumption tax 34.2 33.2
Grenada Customs service charge 10.3 10.3
International trade and transactions 25.7 29.8 27.9
Custom duty 12.3 10.7 9.6
Stamp duty 2.1 1.0 0.8
Travel tax 1.4 1.9 1.5
Jamaica General custom tax 9.3 12.6 10.8
Service custom tax 0.5 3.6 5.2
International trade and transactions 66.3 55.5 51.6 49.7
Import duties 20.8 16.6
Foreign exchange tax 0.0 0.0
St. Kitts and Nevis Consumption tax 21.9 23.4
Customs service charge 5.4 8.0
International trade and transactions 57.7 59.1 55.4 55.4
Import duties 18.8 14.6
Foreign exchange tax 0.0 0.0
Consumption tax 23.8 24.2
St. Lucia Customs service charge 7.8 8.0
International trade and transactions 55.4 52.0 50.3 49.3
Import duties 10.8 10.7
Foreign exchange tax __,
St. Vincent and the Consumption tax 30.5 29.1
Grenadines Customs service charge 5.7 7.3
Guyana International trade taxes 11.16 11.32 9.94
Note: a/ For most counties data is available for 1997-2000 and for 1998-2000 
Source: On the basis of official data.
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Table 23
Trade taxes as percentage of GDP as imports and imports as percentage of GDP
1981-2004
OECS
C ountry V ariables
A verages
CC1 b/ CC2 CC31985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2004 a/
OECS Trade taxes/GDP 12.67 12.21 12.45 12.23 0.25 0.33 -0.83
Trade Taxes/Imports 0.00 22.73 24.45 25.69
Imports/GDP 0.00 53.83 50.93 47.64
Antigua and Barbuda
Trade taxes/GDP 11.86 11.52 12.04 10.91 0.08 0.21 -0.94
Trade Taxes/Imports 16.08 19.11 21.60 23.09
Imports/GDP 75.37 60.34 55.85 47.41
Dominica
Trade taxes/GDP 15.19 13.17 12.89 12.67 0.17 0.63 -0.65
Trade Taxes/Imports 29.70 26.04 27.21 29.81
Imports/GDP 51.70 50.94 47.42 42.75
Grenada
Trade taxes/GDP 13.04 13.84 13.68 13.72 0.91 0.32 -0.66
Trade Taxes/Imports 25.43 30.19 27.66 27.35
Imports/GDP 51.40 45.79 49.45 50.32
St. Kitts and Nevis
Trade taxes/GDP 11.06 8.99 11.33 11.36 0.46 0.33 -0.67
Trade Taxes/Imports 17.78 17.65 23.48 23.88
Imports/GDP 62.21 51.70 48.48 48.19
St. Lucia
Trade taxes/GDP 13.02 13.41 13.01 12.67 0.43 0.17 -0.81
Trade Taxes/Imports 23.68 24.50 27.16 27.96
Imports/GDP 55.02 54.90 47.97 45.46
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Trade taxes/GDP 14.56 11.78 11.95 12.39 -0.04 0.71 -0.72
Trade Taxes/Imports 23.68 22.40 24.01 27.34
Imports/GDP 61.59 52.88 50.01 45.39
Note: a/ The figures for Grenada are for years 2000-2002
b/ CC1 is the correlation coefficient between trade taxes/imports and trade taxes/GDP.
CC2 the correlation coefficient between trade taxes/GDP and imports/GDP.
CC3 the correlation coefficient between trade taxes/imports and imports/GDP.
The Correlation Coefficients are given for 1982-2004. Exceptions are the OECS (1990-2004) and Grenada (1982-2002
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Annex II:
Measuring the static impact through the smart methodology
According to the SMART methodology trade creation is formally specified as:
(1) TC = y *Meu* ((T eul -  T e u o )) /T e u o)
Where:
M eu =merchandise imports from the European Union. 
y  = price elasticity of the demand for imports (y <0).
T eu1 =  tariff rate applied to imports from the European Union after tariff reduction 
T eu0 =  tariff rate applied to imports from the European Union before tariff reduction
According to Eq. (1), trade creation is proportional to imports and to the price elasticity of 
the demand for imports.
For its part trade diversion is equal to:
(2) TD = [Meu*Mrw *[d(peu/prw)/(peu/prw)]*a e u ,rw ]/[Meu+M rw **[d(peu/prw)/(peu/prw)]*a e u ,rw ] 
Where:
M rw = imports from the rest of the world. 
peu = price of the European Union. 
prw = price of the rest of the world.
peu/prw  = relative price of the European Union relative to the rest of the World.
o eu,rw = elasticity of substitution between imports from the European Union and from other
sources.
And,
peu/prw  = [(1+T eu1)/(1+Trw0)]/[(1+T eu0)/(1+Trw0)] — 1
^ e u ,rw  = [d(Meu/M rw)/(Meu/M rw)]/[d(peu/prw)/peu/prw]; ^ e u ,rw  <°-
where,
Trw1 =  tariff rate applied to imports from the rest of the world after tariff reduction 
Trw0 =  tariff rate applied to imports from the rest of the world before tariff reduction
As formulated in Eq.(2) trade diversion is proportional to changes in relative prices, the imports 
from the European Union and the rest of the world and the elasticity of substitution. Trade 
diversion is higher the higher is: (i) the elasticity of substitution, (ii) the change in price and (iii) 
the imports from Europe and the rest of the world.
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Annex III:
The balance-of-payments constrained growth model
I n  a  n u t s h e l l ,  t h e  m o d e l  u s e d  c a n  b e  s u m m a r i z e d  i n  f o u r  s i m p l e  e q u a t i o n s :
( 1 )  X a =  Z ( P a / P b ( 1 + T i ) eZ Si)
( 2 )  M a =  E ( P b / P a ( 1 + X a ) ^ Y ^ i )
( 3 )  P a Z X a  =  P b  S M a
( 4 )  y  =  ( 1 / Z S m aiY ^ i )  [ ( e i S S xai ( t i + ( p a - p i ) + ( 1 / e i )  Z s i ) ]  -  [ V i E S m ai ( t i + ( p a - p i ) ) l  
W h e r e ,
X a =  e x p o r t  v o l u m e  o f  c o u n t r y  a .
M a =  i m p o r t  v o l u m e  o f  c o u n t r y  a .
P a =  p r i c e  o f  e x p o r t a b l e s  o f  a .
P i =  p r i c e  o f  i m p o r t s  f r o m  c o u n t r y  i .
x i =  a d  v a l o r e m  t a r i f f  i m p o s e d  b y  A  o n  o u t s i d e  i m p o r t s .
x i =  a d  v a l o r e m  t a r i f f  i m p o s e d  b y  i  o n  o u t s i d e  i m p o r t s .
S mai=  s h a r e  o f  i m p o r t s  i n  t o t a l  i m p o r t s  o f  c o u n t r y  A  f r o m  c o u n t r y  i .
S xa =  s h a r e  o f  e x p o r t s  i n  t o t a l  e x p o r t s  f r o m  c o u n t r y  A  t o  c o u n t r y  i .  
e  =  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  t h e  e x p o r t s  
s  =  i n c o m e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  e x p o r t s .
£  =  i n c o m e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  i m p o r t s .
L o w e r  c a s e  l e t t e r s  d e n o t e  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h .
E q u a t i o n s  1 a n d  2  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  e x p o r t  a n d  i m p o r t  d e m a n d  f u n c t i o n s .  E q u a t i o n  3  s t a t e s  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s .  E q u a t i o n  4  g i v e s  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  r a t e  o f  
g r o w t h  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s  e q u i l i b r i u m .
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Annex V:
ACP States in Africa and the effects of Cotonou
Of the 80 member States comprising the ACP countries, more than one half (48) are 
African countries. Given their level of development and their size, in geographical terms and in 
terms of population relative to the other ACP members, the Cotonou agreement and the 
implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are of particularly relevance and 
concern to Africa.
As outlined above, implementation of the Cotonou agreement will essentially imply 
replacing current non-reciprocal trading preferences between Europe and ACP member States 
with reciprocal agreements to comply more closely with WTO rules on non-discriminatory 
trading arrangements. EPAs are to be concluded between the EU and ACP countries to dampen 
the effect of the erosion of current non-reciprocal trading preferences. As such, African countries 
share the same concerns vis-à-vis the Cotonou agreement as the other ACP members; these 
concerns relate to i) the effects of preference erosion on fiscal revenue; ii) whether the expected 
trade effects of the agreement will be due to trade creation or in fact trade diversion effects and 
iii) the welfare implications of preference erosion.
Regarding the fiscal impact of the Cotonou Agreement, data availability hampers 
quantitative analysis; however, various studies do indeed point to substantial declines in tariff 
revenue: figures of 24% for Namibia, 37% for Tanzania, 20-30% for Cameroon and 
approximately 25% for the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have 
been noted as potential losses in trade taxes, Cape Verde could lose up to 80% of import 
revenues.59 This is a significant amount for countries where trade taxes count on average for 25% 
of all government revenues and is of particular concern considering that low-income countries 
are only able to recover on average approximately 30% of lost trade tax revenue through other 
sources.60
A recent study of the economic and welfare impacts of EPAs on Africa concluded that 
under full reciprocity, Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade balance is likely to deteriorate by US$1,868 
million (1.3% of GDP) due to increased imports and decreased exports; overall, the welfare loss 
will exceed US$500 million.61 Simultaneously, the European Union is likely to see an 
improvement in its terms of trade equivalent to US$1,748 million (0.4% of GDP) due to 
expansion in its trade to Africa. Moreover, a significant part of this expansion is likely to result 
from trade diversion from the rest of the world as well as from within the EPA grouping itself; 
this diversion will particularly affect sectors that are characterized by a low degree of 
technology, primary sectors such as agriculture and the extracting industries and food-processing 
industries as these sectors will find it increasingly difficult to challenge the increased 
competition from abroad and are likely to falter in Africa. In fact, the majority of industries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to see a decrease in output under full reciprocity.
This impact on intra-African trade is particularly worrisome, especially as intra-African 
trade is already relatively shallow, reaching only approximately 10% of total exports from the
59 See COMESA (2002), EUROSTEP (2004), Ndlela (2003) and Busse et al. (2004).
60 See Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization, IMF Working Paper 11, 2005.
61 See Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership agreements, United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, African Trade Policy Centre, 2005.
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continent. Whilst one factor limiting the potential for intraregional trade is the fact that the 
majority of member States are primary commodity exporters, intraregional trade is hampered by 
weak competitiveness of African industries vis-à-vis industries elsewhere. Moreover, current 
trade arrangements governing the continent have not proven to be conducive to intraregional 
trade: in contrast to other ACP member States, African members have negotiated a number of 
trade agreements. Whilst this per se is a positive development, it has resulted in a situation where 
at present there are 14 ‘Regional Economic Communities’ (RECs) in Africa as well as numerous 
bilateral agreements on trade and investment.62 Such a plethora of agreements has consequently 
led to widespread confusion as to terms and conditions of trade relations between member states 
and is likely to have acted as a deterrent to trade. In fact, these multiple trading agreements have 
not succeeded in attracting foreign direct investment, increasing trade nor attaining higher 
economic growth within the continent: regional trade is hampered by the differing rules of origin 
and customs procedures of each of the RECs. 63
The negative impact of EPSs could be dampened if Africa were able to deepen its 
integration and increase intra-African trade as well as strengthen the competitiveness of its 
industries prior to concluding EPAs.64 Thus, one of the main benefits of the Cotonou Agreement 
is its potential to act as an impetus to revisit and consequently rationalize the current setup of 
regional trading agreements within Africa. For one, multiple membership of RECs conflicts with 
the vision of several RECs to form custom unions and free trade areas. In addition, countries will 
need to decide which regional grouping to join for EPA negotiations as negotiations between the 
European Union and individual RECs will prove impossible with multiple memberships across 
RECs.65
This impetus may however be one of the only benefits of the move to full reciprocity, as 
currently envisaged. To be able to benefit from the Cotonou agreement, African member States 
will need more time than currently foreseen to adequately prepare for the tariff dismantlement 
and strengthen their economies. Once this has taken place, the agreement could actually lead to 
total welfare gains equivalent to US$1,200 million for Sub-Saharan Africa; these gains would 
reach more than US$8,000 if in fact a free trade area between the European Union and Sub- 
Saharan Africa were created in which the partnership were not only WTO compliant (as 
currently foreseen), but in which all trade barriers between the partners were eliminated.
62 Overlapping membership in these RECs is widespread, with only 7 countries belonging exclusively to one REC, whilst 27 
belong to 2 and one (Tanzania) is a member of 4 RECs.
63 See World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness. UNCTAD, 2002
64 See footnote 61.
65 See The Cotonou Agreement and its Implications for the Regional Trade Agenda in Eastern and Southern Africa, World Bank 
Policy Research Paper 3090, 2003.
